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Introduction
“Tis slavery, not to speak one’s thought”
-Euripides, Trojan Women

People love freedom of expression in the abstract but not in practice. In a survey
conducted across 33 countries the median percentage of participants in support of the
statement “people can say what they want” was 94 (Skaaning and Krishnarajan, 7). When
asked whether they support the freedom to express something offensive to their religion and
belief, however, the same participants drop their support to 61 % and further lower it to 41%
when it comes to expression offensive to minority groups (Skaaning and Krishnarajan, 8). It
is only natural for people to want to censor those spreading the ideas they disagree with,
dislike, and fear. Expression offends and upsets, it can lead to emotional pain, and bring
about suffering. It allows those with malicious intentions to organize, garner support, and
execute horrific deeds. Expression is a tool of deception and manipulation. There are plenty
of easily accessible reasons for people to hate it, fear it, and see it fit to persecute and censor
it.
For the majority of history, the burden of proof rested on the shoulders of those few
individuals who viewed free expression as valuable. Unsurprisingly, institutions of power
have been quite comfortable with the idea that “dangerous” expression must be censored for
the common good. Especially at moments when a new technology made expression more
accessible to people, authorities time and time again eagerly stepped up to prevent the
everyman from corrupting the masses through the spread of unvetted ideas. The arguments
warning against the dangers of misinformation on the internet today are a copy of those used
at the dawn of the printing press, the telegraph, the newspaper, and the radio (Mchangama,
5). There is a trade off at play, we are told by those in power: we can have freedom of
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expression, or we can have safety. While the former may have an abstract appeal, safety is
what anyone will choose in practice.
In the chapters ahead I aim to explore the relationship between free expression and
safety and put the supposition that they are in conflict under question. In the first part I will
explore reasons for valuing free expression that come to light in the examination of history of
philosophy. By presenting why Ancient Athenians valued free speech, Locke advocated for
religious toleration, and Mill defended non-conformism, I hope to provide a strong case for
viewing free expression as a fundamental human liberty integral to our personal and public
well-being. I will conclude the section by applying evolutionary principles to ideas in order to
provide an alternative argument for the invaluable role free expression plays in the
construction of knowledge across generations.
In the second part I will explore the reasons behind restricting freedom of expression.
There are at least some instances in which concerns for public safety indeed override the
importance of permitting expression, but there is widespread disagreement about where the
pool of permissible restriction ends. After a brief overview of the current international, US,
and EU legislation, I will forward three standards that ought to govern speech regulation: The
Severity Standard, The Direct Causality Standard, and The Last Resort Standard. I will apply
the three standards to three most common grounds upon which expression is regulated: harm,
offense, and hate. I hope to show that the only cases in which expression should be prohibited
or penalized by a governmental authority are those in which censorship is the only way to
avoid a severe harm that expression would directly cause. I will conclude the section by
discussing the way findings from science are deceptively employed to garner support for less
narrow speech regulation. I hope to show that even though many want them to, neuroscience
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and psychology do not show that expression regulation is the only, or even the best way of
tackling group divisions, hatred, and violence.
In part three I will identify the idea that speech equals violence as the key assumption
backing many contemporary pro-censorial attitudes. There is a long and well discussed
historical tradition of censoring expression to protect respect for a governmental or religious
authority or the moral purity of a community. I chose to focus on censoring expression for the
sake of safety, however, because of the fast growing popularity of pro-censorship arguments
appealing to safety in our public sphere and especially academia. I will argue that the desire
to restrict expression to create “safe environments” stems from a shift in discussing language
as a literal tool of aggression and violence–while language undeniably has power, its power
ought not be understood as equal to that of a punch. After presenting the ways in which some
kinds of speech may be metaphorically portrayed as violent, I will show that understanding
language as an opposite to violence is integral to our ability to morally condemn violent
behavior. I will conclude the section by examining how findings from psychology and
neuroscience apply to the question of whether speech equals violence.
Part four will consist of an exploration of the ways in which playing into the
“speech=violence” fallacy affects educational and academic environments. Because the shift
in understanding language as literally harmful is in its origins academic, the culture forming
in the classrooms and college campuses can serve as a warning against letting the
oversensitivity seep into the public sphere. After discussing the hasty and misguided
popularization of trigger warnings in classrooms, I will analyze the culture of
speech-sensitivity created on US college campuses by those who understand safety as
incompatible with free expression. I will argue that through glorifying emotional safety,
academic institutions have paradoxically become a dangerous place for intellectual activity of
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their students. Finally, I will look at three highly publicized smear campaigns activists ran
against reputed academics because they assumed their work to be a threat to the safety of
vulnerable groups. Such case-studies will serve as examples how quickly the desire to protect
can propagate injustice if guided by emotional thinking rather than a cautious, rational
approach to activism.
Freedom of expression has always been weighed against other values. Like all
freedoms, it brings with it a degree of risk that it will be misused to do ill. In the work ahead,
I hope to offer a reminder of the value of free expression and a warning against the folly of
over-restricting it. Those in favor of censoring and regulating expression too often feign to
act as protectors of the much desired public or community safety. What censorship really
produces, however, is at best a mere illusion of safety. Only an environment in which all
ideas, no matter how unpleasant, can be debated, challenged, and questioned is one in which
human liberty is respected and social problems can be diagnosed and addressed before they
fester into action.
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PART 1: WHY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION MATTERS
A. The Historical and Philosophical Background of Freedom of Expression
1. Ancient Athens
Freedom of speech became an important value as early as in the 5th century BC in the
Greek city state of Athens. Its origins are inseparable with the development of Athenian
democracy so much so that it is difficult to say whether democracy gave birth to freedom of
speech or whether freedom of speech gave birth to democracy. In Ancient Greece, democracy
was a political system based on liberty or euletheria of which freedom of speech was the
“most important and necessary ingredient” (Momigliano, 259). The strength of this
connection relied on the fact that the Assembly—the main decision-making body in Ancient
Athens that consisted of all law-abiding male citizens—granted its members the liberty to
participate in the political decision-making of the polis precisely by addressing each other
and commencing sessions with the famous call: “Who wishes to speak?” (Hansen, 89) In a
short treatise on the Athenian constitution known as The Old Oligarch, its author famously
highlights this link between democracy, freedom of speech, and self-deliberation as he
complains that in a democracy “any worthless person who wishes can stand up in the
assembly and procure what is good for himself and those like him” (Xenophon, 34). Indeed,
freedom of speech sets democracy apart from other authoritarian systems as remarked by the
orator Demosthenes: “a basic difference between Spartan oligarchy and Athenian democracy
is that in Athens you are free to praise the Spartan constitution and way of life, if you so
wish, whereas in Sparta it is prohibited to praise any other constitution than the Spartan”
(Hansen, 77). To expose the nature of the Greek conception of freedom of speech, I will first
examine two core concepts: isegoria or equality in speech and parrhesia or unbridled speech.
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I will continue by laying out three reasons for which freedom of speech is valued in Ancient
Athens and conclude by discussing its limitations.
I. Isegoria
The first concept at the core of Athenian freedom of speech is isegoria or the ability
of every free citizen to address the assembly. This equality of speech is such an essential trait
of democracy that Herodotus uses it to signify the democratic type of governing (Hansen, 83;
Momigliano, 259). However, isegoria establishes equality of opportunity and does not
include natural equality or equality of outcome: “No Athenian expected that every one of the
6000 citizens who attended a meeting of the Assembly could - or would - address his fellow
citizens. Isegoria was not for everyone, but for anyone who cared to exercise his political
rights” (Hansen, 83). Exercising your freedom to speak in Athens, however, required a great
deal of courage: “speaking before one’s fellow citizens required the ability to take risks, to
confront social dangers such as humiliation or shame, and to maintain a level-headed
composure in expressing one’s own opinions before one’s opinionated political equals”
(Balot, 259). Not only humiliation and shame, but sometimes even graver dangers threatened
the speaker because of thorubos, namely the phenomenon of communal jeering, yelling, and
being altogether raucous through which the demos expressed its opinion of what was being
said: “through the thorubos, the Athenians made it clear, through either interrupting or not,
that the demos was all-powerful and was ultimately responsible for the speakers’ freedom to
speak altogether” (Balot, 258). Rather than an inalienable right that protects the individual
from the government, Athenians saw equal opportunity to speak as well as speaking frankly
as a trait of their system.
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II. Parrhesia
Parrhesia or the ability of citizens to speak frankly like isegoria ought not be viewed
as a negative right: “what the Athenians called parrhesia was more a characteristic of their
citizenship than it was a right” (Carter, 211). The unbridled, uninhibited, honest speech,
sometimes referred to as “a citizen attribute” (Carter, 229) was thus a non-ideological trait of
those whom the political system encourages and enables to speak their mind rather than taper
their expression to please an oligarch or a monarch. In Athens parrhesia is associated with
honesty and simplicity of expression and is thus seen at odds with the art of rhetoric that
teaches the speaker how to use language to persuade and manipulate rather than simply
express: “Parrhesia opposed rather than supported the practice of a rhetoric that obscures and
distorts the truth for the sake of individual benefit” (Saxonhouse, 104). Demosthenes
highlights this opposition by concluding his Philippic IV with a declaration of his
commitment to parrhesia: “There you have the truth spoken with all freedom, simply in
goodwill and for the best—no speech packed by flattery with mischief and deceit and
intended to put money into the speaker's pocket and the control of the State into our enemies'
hands” (10.76). Athenians therefore view the principle of parrhesia as something that
promotes the interests of the community, often at a personal risk of shame and humiliation.
However, what was the perceived value of nourishing such a culture of free expression based
on equality of opportunity, frankness, and honesty?
III. Self-determination
Herodotus in Histories connects isegoria with the ability to self-govern and determine
one’s own political fate but also with an increased initiative of individuals to participate in
politics. In book 5 he writes: “So the Athenians grew in power and proved, not in one respect
only but in all, that equality [in speech: isegorie] is a good thing. Evidence for this is the fact
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that while they were under tyrannical rulers, the Athenians were no better in war than any of
their neighbors, yet once they got rid of their tyrants, they were by far the best of all. This,
then, shows that while they were oppressed, they were, as men working for a master,
cowardly, but when they were freed, each one was eager to achieve for himself” (5.78). He
presents what can be seen as an early version of the later libertarian idea that leaving people
free to pursue their own perhaps at times selfish interests leads to public good. Freedom of
speech that grants the Athenians the ability to participate in the political-decision making,
according to Herodotus, leads to greater military success, perhaps precisely because one
fights with greater fervor for one’s own cause than for that of a tyrant.
IV. Decision-making Accuracy
Another reason for which the Athenians value free speech is because it leads to a
greater quality of decision-making. Demosthenes in Exordia emphasizes that the freedom of
Athenians to raise objections and concerns about the proposed course of action guards the
city from making rash decisions: “In my opinion, men of Athens, no intelligent citizen would
deny that it is best of all for the city, preferably at the outset not to do anything inexpedient,
but otherwise, that those should be on hand who will object at once” (Ex. 49. 1). In other
words, Demosthenes emphasizes that a decision maker more likely succumbs to emotion or
folly and makes a poorer decision if no one dares to disagree with him. In order for Athens to
reap the benefits of communal decision-making, however, Demosthenes sees it crucial that
people listen to each other: “To this must be added, however, that you shall be willing to
listen and learn; for nothing is gained by having a man who will give the best counsel unless
he shall have people who will listen to him” (Ex. 49. 1). Through this subtle critique of
thorubos, Demosthenes emphasizes the risk of the Athenians to self-sabotage and undo the
societal benefits of free speech by too rapidly suppressing displeasing speech.
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V. True Courage
Apart from enabling self-deliberation and bettering the quality of decision-making,
Pericles in the famous funeral oration from Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War
links freedom of speech to the ability to develop true courage. Because Athenians often
needed to defend their political systems against accusations of military inefficacy, Pericles
considers it important to first emphasize that deliberation does not impede action: “The great
impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which
is gained by discussion preparatory to action” (42. 2). He continues by drawing a distinction
between being brave due to ignorance and being courageous as a result of having carefully
considered a decision before acting: “For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act
and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon
reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest
sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger”
(42.3). By juxtaposing the ability to discuss a decision with the ability to think it through, he
links the two to informed and decisive action which he presents as the basis for exercising
courage.
VI. Limitations
The value of freedom of speech is instrumental for the Athenians. They adopt it
because they see democratic and discussion-based decision-making as means to a greater
military and political success. Free speech belongs primarily to the Assembly and is subject
to the will of the demos. The most famous case in which the demos punishes speech is the
trial of Socrates in 399 BCE at which the famous philosopher receives a death sentence for
not believing in the gods the city believed in and for corrupting the youth. Some consider it a
great failure of free speech and deliberation that the jury found Socrates guilty. Others,
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however, emphasize that in no place apart from Athens, could Socrates have been so free to
openly critique the city’s way of governing for decades without punishment. If we view
Socrates as a public threat, it could possibly be argued that Athenians punished speech in
only the cases of the most severe offense and “limited free speech (and other freedoms) only
to protect the democracy from substantive, material harm” (Wallace, 213). Hansen, however,
points out that Plato and Aristotle write most unfavorably about democracy as well which he
sees as grounds to understand Socrates’s trial as “an isolated occurrence” in what is otherwise
an admirable legacy of free speech in Athens: “the criticism of democracy to be heard in
Athenian sources is the strongest possible evidence that the Athenians’ pride in their freedom
of speech was not unfounded” (26). Regardless of which interpretation we sympathize with,
Socrates’s execution happens because the Athenians do not understand free speech as
something of intrinsic worth that belongs to every individual. Rather, they view it as a public
tool with instrumental value that may be overridden by greater concerns such as presented by
an old man questioning the political and religious backbone of Athenian society.

2. The Early Modern Period
One of the most important steps in the historical development of the value of free
expression as conceived by modernity is the transition from viewing free expression as an
instrumental good subject to being overridden versus regarding it as a fundamental
inalienable right of intrinsic worth to every human being. The ideas of John Locke, an
English 17th century philosopher, most notably helped facilitate the leap. James Madison, the
drafter of the most important piece of legislation protecting the right of expression, “adapted
Lockean principles to defend freedom of speech” (McGinnis, 60) in the First Amendment. To
readers of Locke it should come as no surprise that the founding fathers of the US would find
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principles around which to build a liberty-preserving society in Locke’s writings. After all, in
his writing Locke notably defends the right to self-determination by arguing that people are
“by nature all free, equal, and independent” (49) and that as such they ought to be able to
“dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit” (4). Because the government’s
power according to Locke comes from people’s free decision to unite, a government may
exercise political force over its people only to ensure public safety and protect fundamental
liberties of the individual. Accepting Locke’s conclusion that there are certain inalienable
rights deserving of governmental protection, however, does not in itself establish that
freedom of speech is one of them. To examine the important transition that leads to the
inclusion of freedom of speech amongst a person’s most basic rights, I will take a close look
at Locke’s arguments in A Letter Concerning Toleration and discuss their implications. I aim
to show that Locke’s philosophical works set the ground for elevating freedom of speech
from something instrumentally useful to an intrinsically valuable right—an idea that
flourishes in the writing of the First Amendment.
I. Religious Toleration in Context
In 17th century Europe religious toleration was on shaky grounds. On the continent,
the Peace of Augsburg (1555) which ensured that the ruler could choose the religion for his
subjects (cuius regio, eius religio) collapsed at the beginning of the century and began the
Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire. While the Jacobean era in England brought
some relief from religious strife, “Bloody Mary’s” burnings of religious dissenters were far
from forgotten. Because of the tense political circumstances Locke himself fled England and
situated himself in the more religiously tolerant Dutch republic in 1683 where he wrote A
Letter Concerning Toleration. His call for toleration and secularism came after centuries of
religious discord during which the common attitude was religious uniformity, namely the
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practice of the government to promote one religion at the cost of other beliefs.1 Religious
identity at the time, however, greatly defined all areas of an average person’s life as religious
rituals and holidays made up a big part of a community’s social life. Moreover, an
intellectual’s education included interpretation of sacred texts and important philosophical
deliberations of the time often revolved around questions of religious dogma. Enforcing a
certain religion therefore significantly affected people’s daily lives and put limits to their
intellectual activities
Given that such a political climate makes severe restrictions of people’s freedoms
quite commonplace, Locke’s defense of religious toleration aptly focuses on re-establishing
individual’s liberty as the capital value of any just society. William Popple, a Unitarian
merchant and religious writer states the diagnosis of the political situation in 17th century
Europe presumed to motivate Locke’s writing as lack of liberty: “Absolute Liberty, Just and
True Liberty, Equal and Impartial Liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of” (123). In the
letter that follows, Locke voices his defense of freedom of religion, ultimately arriving at the
conclusion that “Liberty of Conscience is every man's natural Right” and that “no body ought
to be compelled in matters of Religion, either by Law or Force” (159). He supports his
argument by two separate lines of reasoning, one that outlines the nature of the government
and the church, and the other that focuses on the nature of belief. He argues that the
government should not and cannot curtail an individual's freedom of belief.
II. Nature of the Government and the Church
The first way Locke goes about defending religious toleration is by arguing that it is
neither the business of the government, not the church to force religion onto people: the
government ought not interfere in spiritual matters that determine the soul’s salvation and
1

For a more detailed discussion of historical circumstance see Murphy’s Conscience and Community: Revisiting
Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America
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eternal life, whereas the church ought not meddle in laws or employ civic force. He begins by
defining the government as “a Society of Men [sic] constituted only for the procuring,
preserving, and advancing of their own Civil Interests” and defines civil interests as
individual’s person and property: “Civil Interests I call Life, Liberty, Health, and Indolency of
body; and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture, and
the like” (128). He sees the government as overstepping its role in interfering with an
individual’s religion because he views religious beliefs as personal and an individual’s
freedom to live according to them as crucial to self-determination: “it appears not that God
has ever given any such Authority to one Man over another, as to compell any one to his
Religion. Nor can any such Power be vested in the Magistrate by the Consent of the People;
because no man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the
choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or Worship he
shall embrace” (128). In other words, the choice of religion is too important to be outsourced.
Because in choosing to follow a religion, a believer works towards ensuring afterlife for his
soul, one must choose one’s faith alone and carry the responsibility of one’s choice. The
government may regulate public affairs by, for example, running healthcare and training the
military, but it has no claim to people’s spiritual life.
Unlike the government, the church concerns itself with people’s spiritual life. Because
the primary goal of the church is to save souls, Locke argues that it should not use any form
of worldly power to coerce people to become its members. According to Locke the church is
“a voluntary Society of Men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the
publick worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him and effectual
to the Salvation of their Souls” (130). He sees great importance in emphasizing that just as
members of church join voluntarily, they may voluntarily leave if unconvinced by the
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doctrine: “No Member of a Religious Society can be tied with any other Bonds but what
proceed from the certain expectation of eternal Life” (130). By appealing to Matthew 8:20,2
he refutes the objection that a religion needs authority figures such as Bishops or apostles
who need to be able to exercise some sort of power. He as effectively addresses the objection
that power is necessary for enforcing religion’s laws by emphasizing that forcing people to
abide by certain religious rules is useless if they are internally disinclined to follow them
(130). To highlight that it is necessary for religious institutions to refrain from exercising
force, Locke points at the situation familiar to his reader: the chaos of religious strife that
originates in religions’ conviction that their own doctrine is correct and that they may
exercise power to forward it. He asks: “But if one of those Churches hath this Power of
treating the other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom the Power belongs, and by what
right?” (135). Many have claimed to have the one true answer to this question, but each
argues in support of their own religion. Locke’s remark that “every Church is Orthodox to
itself; to others, Erroneous or Heretical” (135) thus bears much truth and highlights the
importance of tolerance for peace. If both the government and the church were strictly
fulfilling their functions, tolerance would be a given. Yet due to their tendency to overstep
their jurisdictions, religious conflicts remain a sad reality to this day.
III. Nature of Belief
The second line of reasoning Locke adopts in support of toleration consists of
highlighting that personal and internal nature of belief renders any use of force futile. He
emphasizes that true significance of religion lies in its ability to affect people’s minds: “All
the Life and Power of true Religion consist in the inward and full perswasion of the mind”
(128). Therefore, demanding external compliance with rules of religion is counterproductive
2

In Matthew 8:20 Jesus says: “For where two or three gather in my name, there am I with them.”
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to religion’s aim to save souls from damnation: “Whatever Profession we make, to whatever
outward Worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our mind that the one is true…
such Practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great Obstacles to our Salvation”
(128). Because thought and action differ in natures, changing people’s actions by force does
little to reform their privately held beliefs: “And such is the nature of the Understanding, that
it cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward Force. Confiscation of Estate,
Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that Nature can have any such Efficacy as to make Men
change the inward Judgment that they have framed of things” (129). Locke thus proposes that
rather than by force, minds can only be changed, and religion effectively spread by
non-violent rational means such as discussion and reasoning: “It is only Light and Evidence
that can work a change in Men’s Opinions. And that Light can in no manner proceed from
corporal Sufferings, or any other outward Penalties” (129). He illustrates his theory of the
nature of belief-reforms by personifying truth as an entity which carries enough power and
significance to impress itself onto people’s mind without the aid of external force: “if Truth
makes not her way into the Understanding by her own Light, she will be but the weaker for
any borrowed force Violence can add to her” (153). Discussing truth in such terms may be an
idealization, but an attractive claim lies at the core of his argument—the pen is mightier than
the sword.
IV. The Value of Free Expression
Even though Locke’s arguments advocate for religious toleration, they have been
recognized as highly relevant to debates on freedom of expression. Locke’s conception of the
government’s and the church’s place in the society and their duties towards an individual
establish a strong case for freedom of thought, also referred to as freedom of belief or
“Liberty of Conscience.” While the matter certainly warrants a more careful discussion, I
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hope that for the time being we can acknowledge the close bond between freedom of thought
and freedom of speech: being free to think what you want means little without being able to
express one’s thoughts and vice versa. Those interpreting Locke’s writing picked up on the
connection between freedom to think and freedom to express one’s thoughts and have used it
as grounds for establishing freedom of expression as intrinsically valuable.
VI. Property-Based Understanding of Freedom of Speech
Even though Locke never states it explicitly, his interpreters take his philosophy to
contain all the necessary elements for believing that Locke would stand against governmental
restriction of expression because he would have counted freedom of speech amongst
individual’s fundamental and inalienable rights. In other words, not only would Locke see
instrumental value in freedom of expression, but he would also consider it a member of the
natural rights of life, liberty, and property. In counting freedom of speech as a natural right,
Locke fundamentally shifts the discussion regarding liberty of expression—free speech that
was thus far valued for promoting important societal goods must now be considered as an
intrinsically valuable necessary aspect of an individual’s dignity.
The interpretation that puts Locke at the forefronts of freedom of speech finds its
textual support in Locke’s discussion of property. In “The Once and Future Property-Based
Vision of the First Amendment,” John McGinnis presents Madison’s interpretation of
Lockean principles and argues that Locke paves the way for freedom of speech to be
considered as an important aspect of a person’s right to own and manage his own property.
McGinnis refers to two of Locke’s statements, namely that “every Man has a Property in his
own Person” and that “the Labour of his Body and the Work of his Hands…are properly his”
(15). Madison makes the crucial connection between these statements by explicitly referring
to the ideas that a man produces his property as he asserts that a man has “a property right in
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his opinions” (66). Madison thus proposes that just as people have a natural right to own and
manage property, they have a natural right to own and manage the fruits of their intellectual
labors, namely their thoughts and opinions. McGinnis demonstrates the presence of all the
ingredients necessary for this conclusion in Locke’s writings by bringing up Locke’s
understanding of property in relation to autonomy. According to McGinnis, Locke holds that
an investment of energy into matter grounds an individual’s claim to ownership: “an
individual owns property by applying his labour to matter and thus infusing his spirit into
nature” (66). Just as we work to attain material goods, we invest labor and energy into the
production of our own thoughts and therefore have a claim to express them freely. The
premises Locke lays down therefore enable Madison to justify granting freedom of speech
such an important place in American legislation.
Because Locke sees the protection of private property as one of the key tasks of
government, conceptualizing speech as property guarantees his opposition to regulation of
freedom of speech. He would, however, oppose speech regulation even without such a move.
At the core of Locke’s political philosophy lies the idea that government exists to ensure
public peace and security and ought to interfere in an individual’s life as little as possible:
“Any exercise of political power over individual behavior which did not threaten peace or
security was an exercise of power unjustified by the end for which that power existed”
(Donne, 32). Therefore, according to the spirit of Lockean arguments freedom of speech
belongs to basic human liberties as it protects the autonomy of an individual from
governmental interference. Locke presents thought and expression as fruits of our labor in a
way that makes it an easy step for Madison to view them as our intellectual property and
write that “a man has a property in his opinions and the free communication of them” and
that a just government “impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own” (65).
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Therefore, even though Locke primarily writes about the freedom of religious belief, his
political philosophy presents freedom of thought and expression as an intrinsically valuable
trait of a free society and inspires the inclusion of freedom of speech into the American
Constitution.

3. Mill
John Stuart Mill, arguably the most famous defender of free expression, offers a
comprehensive account of the values of free expression that integrates both intrinsic and
instrumental reasons. In On Liberty (1859) he presents a theory aimed to “make the fitting
adjustment between individual independence and social control” (76), namely, to forward an
argument as to what laws ought to govern the relationship between the society and the
individual. While he declares that he will “forego any advantage” he may get by presenting
freedom of expression as intrinsically valuable in the Lockean sense, his arguments bring to
light both instrumental and intrinsic value of free speech. Namely, by presenting intellectual
liberties of thought, expression, and discussion as means to a healthy society and individual
autonomy, Mill constructs such intellectual liberties as the essential attribute of public and
private good. Furthermore, he emphasizes that being exposed to all kinds of opinions is a
prerequisite for anyone’s intellectual flourishment and an effective method of
truth-discernment. Behind such seemingly instrumental arguments, however, lies the
foundational idea that an intellectually thriving society with autonomous individuals is a good
in itself. Mill lays this foundation by arguing that freedom of thought and expression are
inseparable; despite its public nature, speech is a self-regarding act whose free exercise is
essential for personal autonomy. After discussing Mill’s foundational argument for free
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speech, I will lay out his three epistemic arguments for free expression grounded in the
instrumental importance of free discussion for the pursuit of truth.
I. The Foundation: Free Expression and Intellectual Autonomy
At the very beginning of On Liberty, Mill outlines two aspects of human life in which
an individual ought to be free: thoughts and actions. While there are instrumental reasons to
ensure that an individual may act and think freely—e.g. greater creativity and productivity,
Mill does not draw on them. The lack of emphasis on the instrumental good of free thought
and action suggests that Mill’s reason for bringing up the two basic components of
self-determination is to outline the areas of being in which a person ought to be free because
individual liberty is an intrinsic good. According to Mill, freedom of action equals a freedom
to live as we please or the liberty “of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow” (83). Such a liberty is
relatively straightforward and limited only by the duty to refrain from impeding on the ability
of others to act freely as well. Freedom of thought, however, refers not merely to
introspective activities such as “liberty of conscience…liberty of thought and
feeling…freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects” (82). Rather, Mill takes a crucial
step in arguing that liberty of expression, namely freedom of speech and publication is an
integral part of freedom of thought. By including it under freedom of thought, Mill brings
free expression into the realm of intrinsically valuable liberties.
Mill acknowledges that freedom of expression appears other-regarding and as such
may not appear an intrinsically valuable liberty, essential to the protection of an individual’s
dignity. Rather, it appears to be a liberty that we value instrumentally for its social value.
Freedom of expression “may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that
part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people” (82). However, Mill
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maintains that thought and expression are “practically inseparable” (83). He states that the
two are “resting in great part on the same reasons” (83) thereby implying that one cannot
exist without the other. Indeed, that expression depends on thought has immediate intuitive
allure: while we colloquially say that people sometimes ‘speak without thinking’ or ‘blurt
speech out,’ such instances of quick and spontaneous speech in most cases reveals inner
thoughts and sentiments of the speaker rather than attests to their absence. Before expressing
any idea, one must, however briefly, first conjure it up in thought. The dependence of thought
on expression, however, seems less straightforward. We are certainly capable of having
thoughts without expressing them. However, most thoughts that we have in some way or
other depend on expression we have witnessed: a complex thought such as ‘capitalism is a
superior system to communism’ surely arises in my mind in part because of books that I have
read and even a simple thought such as ‘I see a tree’ depends on other people teaching me the
meaning of words I need to formulate it. In short, we are limited in our inventory of ideas if
we do not have the access to the marketplace in which they are freely expressed. As Rourke
in his commentary of Mill suggests, we cannot intellectually flourish without accessing the
ideas of others:
“Without intellectual independence, which can be achieved primarily through education
and by encouraging individuals to think for themselves, people cannot be said to be in a
position to make an informed choice concerning what constitutes their own good. But
people are unable to make an informed choice unless they can consider all sides of a
question: freedom of thought is of little or no value if people are not at liberty to hear
the private opinions of others. To be deprived of the opportunity to compare and
contrast ideas is to be deprived of education and the opportunity to expand one’s
intellect.” (78)
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In all areas of social life from art and the business world to academia, we cherish
originality of thought. However, we often fail to acknowledge that already present ideas
enable the birth of what we consider novelty. For example, the literary critic Harold Bloom
argues in Anxiety of Influence that there is no such thing as a completely original poem—each
author steps into a conversation with his predecessors and in his work reworks and
reinterprets theirs. Indeed, originality requires inspiration; genius consists of recombining the
ideas of the past in new ways. Thus, in order to have a rich intellectual life with diverse and
far-reaching thoughts, we must have the thoughts of others at our disposal. We are social
animals to the extent that our innermost thoughts and with them the essence of our
individuality depends on our fellow humans. Our ability to exercise intellectual autonomy
thus depends on the freedom to think and express thoughts to the same extent that our
personal autonomy depends on being able to act and move around freely.
Mill implicitly picks up on the intellectual vulnerability of humankind to social
pressures when he warns against the influence of the oppression of public opinion. He views
the tyranny of majority that uses methods such as social stigmatization and shaming as even
more dangerous to intellectual freedoms than political oppression by virtue of legal
restrictions—the former “leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into
the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself” (76). He defends the right and value of
dissent against the “tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling” (76) and warns that societal
norms tend to “prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways”
(76). Once again, the implicit reasons behind Mill’s warnings lean on the assertion that there
is intrinsic value in a liberated, self-determining mode of being. Mill could have brought up
instrumental reasons for preserving difference of opinion: history offers us plenty of instances
when the majority strayed in their judgment of right and wrong and non-conformism saved
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the day. To name just few examples, loudly stated dissent from majority opinion served as a
spark for Reformation, female suffrage, and The Civil Rights Act. While historical examples
present the instrumental value of non-conformism, Mill aims to ground his defense of dissent
on opinion in a more fundamental assertion, namely that “there is a limit to the legitimate
interference of collective opinion with individual independence” (76). Mill’s defense of free
expression and his emphasis on the need to protect an individual’s right to dissent relies on a
basic idea that protecting an individual’s intellectual autonomy is a good in itself that ought
not to be overridden by the inconvenience caused by the dissemination of offensive,
outrageous, and unpleasant ideas.
II. The Utility of Free Expression for Truth-Seeking
Even though Mill hints at intrinsic reasons for valuing free expression in the
introductory arguments of On Liberty, the most famous part of Mill’s writing consists of
epistemological arguments. In three separate arguments, Mill outlines the instrumental value
of free expression—it contributes to the pursuit of truth. First, Mill argues that stifling an
opinion falsely assumes infallibility, second, he argues that even false opinions contribute to
truth, and third, he argues that many beliefs contain partial truths. His arguments establish
that there should be no interference with the discussion of any opinion, however unpleasant
and controversial.
a) Infallibility
Mill argues that whoever wishes to stifle an opinion illegitimately asserts that
their own view is absolutely certain: “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility” (88). He sees the restriction of other people’s opinions on the assumption of
infallibility as an epistemic flaw. No one has grounds to be absolutely certain in their own
right because of the indirect nature of experience—we do not interact directly with the world,
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but merely interpret our subjective experience by engaging imperfect faculties of judgment.
Therefore, absolute certainty is unattainable. On such a simple interpretation, Mill’s argument
opens itself up to the kind of objections that plague simple truth relativism that claims we
cannot know anything to be true: if we cannot assume infallibility about any opinion, then we
cannot assume that this very ban of assuming infallibility is infallible and applies universally.
However, Mill’s argument does not aim to prohibit an individual from forming beliefs and
acting according to them due to the lack of absolute certainty. Mill recognizes that there is
“assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life” that allows us to act according to our
beliefs and to “assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct” (89).
Because we cannot have absolute certainty, however, marking someone else’s belief as
absolutely false and prohibiting its discussion assumes one’s own opinion as absolute truth.
Mill emphasizes that personally we may hold a conviction and advocate for it without closing
off the possibility of it being disputed and overruled by new evidence: “There is greatest
difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for
contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting
its refutation” (89). New experience and data help us correct our misconceptions, but we need
discussion to interpret and bring meaning to them (90). We need to remain open to the
possibility that we are wrong because assuming infallibility is epistemically dishonest.
Besides expressing epistemic concerns, however, Mill condemns assuming
infallibility by imposing our own opinions onto others as a moral violation of our
responsibility to allow people to form their own opinions. Mill argues that to prohibit
someone else’s opinion, our standard of certainty must be much higher than the level of
certainty that we need to make decisions on our own. In fact, to force others to hold an
opinion, we would have to know it to be true with absolute certainty—anything less than
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certainty unfairly imposes onto others our own epistemic risk of being wrong. Such a line of
reasoning in some ways resembles the way we think about decision-making about people’s
health. Bioethics puts a great emphasis on patient autonomy precisely because any medical
procedure involves certain risks. It is not morally acceptable for someone else to force a
patient into undertaking a medical procedure because allowing the patient to make their own
choices and to take on responsibility for the risks involved in undergoing a certain procedure
is integral to respecting their autonomy. Just as we ought to respect a patient’s autonomy in
the medical context, we ought to respect people’s intellectual autonomy to form their own
opinions.
By writing Mill’s Infallibility argument in standard form, we can see how epistemic
and moral considerations intermix to support Mill’s conclusion:
1. Each person ought to form their own opinions and holds responsibility for the risks
of being mistaken.
2. We ought not impose an opinion onto others unless we have absolute certainty that
we are infallible in forming it.
3. No matter our level of confidence, we cannot assume infallibility of our own view
because we can never exclude the possibility that evidence might arise in the future
that will prove us wrong.
4. By prohibiting the discussion of someone else’s opinion, we assume the infallibility
of our own view.
5. We ought not and cannot prohibit the discussion of someone else’s opinion.

Mill’s conclusion forbids imposing opinions onto others on both epistemic and moral
grounds. While premises 1 and 2 outline moral responsibilities we hold in our own and other
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people’s belief-formation process, premise 3 arises out of skepticism towards our ability to
attain epistemic certainty. Furthermore, this standard formulation of the argument shows that
Mill does not require everyone to adopt radical skepticism towards all of their opinions:
because we carry responsibility for our own mistakes, we are at liberty to form our own
beliefs even without having absolute certainty. When imposing ideas onto others, however,
we ought to abide by a higher standard.
b) False Beliefs
Even though Mill’s first argument effectively establishes that all opinions ought to be
discussed since we cannot be certain they are not true, Mill goes on to strengthen his case by
explaining that even if we were absolutely certain of an opinion’s falsity, it would still be a
mistake to prohibit its discussion. In his defense of the value of false beliefs, he lays out a
view of the nature of truth and knowledge. According to Mill, to unwittingly assent to a
proposition does not mean knowing the truth: “Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the
more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (103). Rather, knowing a
true proposition requires an understanding of both the positive arguments grounding it and
the negative arguments that address attempts to falsify it. Moreover, being justified in holding
an opinion necessitates a capacity to defend one’s own belief. To do so, one must know the
arguments of those who think otherwise and have the ability to point out why they are false:
“when we turn… to morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life,
three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the
appearances which favor some opinion different from it” (104) Without knowing what the
dissenters think about a subject and being able to explain why their arguments fail to hold
water, we cannot claim to know and understand our own view in a meaningful sense. Not
merely tolerating but engaging with false opinions thus bears insurmountable value for our
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own intellectual prowess: “So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and
human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to
imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil’s
advocate can conjure up” (105). Therefore, even if we are certain a view is false, we ought
not to censor it as its falsity helps us better to understand the truth.
c) Partial Truths
To conclusively establish the importance of free discussion, Mill offers a third
argument that supports the value of partial truths. He argues that opinions rather than being
true or false often fall into the gray area of partial truths: “when the conflicting doctrines,
instead of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the
nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of truth, of which the received
doctrine embodies only a part” (112). Speaking of degrees of trueness might seem like an
illegitimate epistemological move and it is not what Mill is doing. Rather, Mill recognizes
that people’s views and opinions on complex issues are made up of a bundle of propositions
which rarely contain no falsehoods. Since our faculties of judgment necessarily depend only
on the limited number of facts and experience known to us, we are prone to error. To escape
biases of subjectivity and attain anything close to objective knowledge, we must thus consult
others and through their testimony access data that helps us reach a better judgment. Precisely
our epistemic codependence leads Mill to argue that any opinion—especially the
non-conformist one—ought to be freely discussed as it may contain a nugget of truth that we
would otherwise have overlooked: “every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion
of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever
amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended” (112). If we honestly examine our
faculties of reason and consider them alongside the immeasurable totality of what there is to
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know, we can appreciate the folly of discarding any fragment of truth merely because it
comes wrapped in falsehoods.
III. An Overview
Mill may have risen to such prominence through defending free expression precisely
because he skilfully integrates both the instrumental and intrinsic reasons for the value of free
expression. He offers a compelling analysis of the fundamental nature of expression that
presents expression as more than a mere other-regarding attempt at communication and
establishes its role in enabling individuals to think for themselves and have rich internal lives.
As such, Mill offers a reinforced and upgraded version of the Lockean view since he
emphasizes not merely the intrinsic value of being able to speak freely, but also the worth of
being exposed to various opinions of others. Furthermore, Mill’s view presents an upgrade to
the historical arguments that recognize merely the instrumental worth of free expression.
Whereas the Greeks already viewed discussion as a way to improve decision-making, their
eagerness to shout down and condemn non-conforming views demonstrates an absence of
appreciation for dissenting voices. By defending the didactical value of falsities and partial
truths, Mill puts together a case for embracing free expression that transcends historical
boundaries as it proves itself as relevant now as it would have been in Mill’s, Locke’s, or
ancient times.
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B. Freedom of Expression from an Evolutionary Perspective
Various arguments in favor of freedom of expression in the history of philosophy
successfully establish the importance of said liberty for the functioning of our democracies,
societies, and minds. However, the importance of free expression is not exhausted by
considerations from humanists and social scientists. Considering how evolutionary principles
apply to freedom of expression grants us a deeper understanding of the value and the dangers
of freeing speech. It leads us to a rather shocking conclusion that the progress of the human
species and to an extent our survival depends on freedom of expression. After explaining the
theory grounding this section, I will examine how the principle of natural selection and
multi-level selection theory apply to ideas and argue that they both suggest that it is in our
interest to allow for variability of ideas. I will then address considerations from memetics as a
potential reason for censorship. Memetics will lead me to refine my conclusion by proposing
that valuing variability of ideas is of much greater evolutionary value to us if paired with
deliberate efforts to promote a widespread use of truth-discernment techniques.
In daring to think about freedom of expression from an evolutionary perspective, I am
implicitly asserting that evolution has a say in what has traditionally been perceived as a legal
or philosophical rather than a scientific topic. My writing leans on the fundamental conjecture
of universal Darwinism proposed by Richard Dawkins: natural selection does not merely
work on genes, but on any imperfect replicator (Dawkins). In other words, anything that
replicates in a way that sometimes by accident or deliberately generates multiple versions of
itself evolves overtime because the principle of selection favors its more successful versions.
Success of imperfect replicators consists of their ability to spread in their environment, thus
maximizing their own survival. Applying the selective principle known in evolutionary
theory as natural selection to reproducing things other than genes generates interesting
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theories about the development of various aspects of human culture. With the help of
universal Darwinism, we can for example explain why ice cream became a sweet rather than
a savory dish, why Facebook did better in drawing in users than MySpace, or why Beyonce’s
music attracts more listeners than Stravinsky. Today, however, I aim to apply evolutionary
principles to ideas. Indeed, unlike genes, ideas do not replicate themselves only in passing
from one generation to another but rather spread to anyone listening to or reading their
expression. They mutate because of our faulty memories and our tendency to knowingly or
unknowingly adjust ideas to our worldviews before sharing them further. Because they
replicate and mutate, however, they are according to universal Darwinism subject to natural
selection.
The most straightforward way of applying natural selection to ideas suggests that just
as genes, the ideas selected for are the ones that best contribute to their survival. Because we
are the vehicles of an idea’s replication, our survival increases the chances of us replicating
the idea, thereby often rendering the most replicated ideas the ones that most contribute to our
survival as well. The link between the replicatory success of an idea and its contribution to
our survival can be easily seen in simple examples, for example, in lessons commonly taught
to children such as that you ought to be careful when interacting with strangers. Similar trend
lies in the successful spread of ideas about effective wound-treatment after the discovery of
the connection between lack of hygiene and infections. Many such ideas considered as
common knowledge made their way into our mental inventories because the truths that they
communicate such as “stranger danger” and “germs bad” directly contribute to our survival.
At first glance, it might seem that ideas selected for are mostly the ones communicating
something true about our environment—to best adapt and survive, we must after all know the
truth about the conditions putting us in danger. However, while a great deal of ideas aids us in
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surviving because they are true, there are many equally helpful, successfully replicating ideas
that are quite likely false. For example, most of us hold certain ideas about ourselves and our
loved ones as having value, being important, and significant even though we and our loved
ones are likely to be at the best average or unremarkable and at the worst downright
unsuccessful at most things we do. Ideas about afterlife and divinity occupy a similar
function of motivating us to keep living regardless of their truth status. In brief, natural
selection is no Galileo dedicated to discovering the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. On the contrary, the process of natural selection at an individual level discriminates
against ideas for their utility rather than their truth.
To establish the importance of increasing the variability of ideas for discovering truth,
we must shift the focus of our analysis and examine the way natural selection of ideas
operates on a group level. There are plenty of ideas that stick around even though they do not
directly contribute to an individual’s survival such as the beliefs that we must fulfill our civic
duties, ought to feel guilty if we kill a stranger, or that everyone should study arithmetic. To
explain the presence of such sentiments we must apply the Multilevel Selection theory that
claims that natural selection does not merely select for ideas and genes in as far as they
increase the survivability of an individual, but also in as far they increase the survivability of
a groups because “groups are most successful (and, thus, able to accomplish their goals and
outcompete other groups) when they are able to suppress self-serving behavior that harms the
group and to encourage cooperative and altruistic behavior that serves the group” (Seaman &
Wilson, 1029). In other words, prosocial behavior and sentiments occur so frequently because
belonging to a successful group bolsters an individual’s (and his genes’) chances of survival
and reproduction to a greater extent than endowing the individual with good genes and letting
him fend for himself.

34

Initially, it may seem that prosocial ideas that survive because they contribute to the
survival of a group are subject to the same kinds of epistemic concerns as the one
contributing to an individual’s survival—natural selection again selects for what is useful
rather than what is true. However, on a group level much worse long-term evolutionary
consequences await groups entertaining false beliefs. For example, a cluster of ideas very
popular amongst Shakers, an 18th century American sect, bade people that they all ought to
live in celibacy. Unsurprisingly, Shakers and their ideas became virtually extinct. I do not
mean to imply that all groups that face evolutionary failure and go extinct do so due to
epistemic error, nor that all the victors of history were right. My proposal is much more
modest, namely that because extinction on a group level often comes as a result of lacking
important information, there is a deep-set evolutionary incentive for groups to attain the
knowledge of truth. Healing illnesses, defeating enemies, and ensuring resources for survival
all depend on knowledge and without a doubt increase a group’s reproductive fitness.
Because of such high stakes, groups tend to develop systematic methodologies of storing and
propagating knowledge that we refer to as science and education. Steve Stewart-Williams in
The Ape that Understood the Universe supports such a conclusion by describing the
development of science as “an evolutionary process within the realm of ideas,” (229) one
depending on the Darwinian principles of variation and selection. He outlines the reasons
which suggest that natural selection because of the way it functions on a group level enables a
spontaneous development a collective truth-producing mechanism:
“Scientists propose competing theories about the nature of the universe (variation), and
then cull those theories that don’t match what they see in the world and in the lab
(selection)…. In effect, the scientific method establishes a struggle for existence among
theories, which results ultimately in the survival of the fittest theories: those that best
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explain the facts. The end result is that our theories evolve – step by slow step – toward
greater and greater accuracy” (229)
If on a group level natural selection selects for ideas that promote the survivability of the
group and the survivability of the group is on the most part dependent on the group’s ability
to acquire true beliefs, then letting selection run its course ought to gradually bring us to the
truth. The best way to contribute to our group’s evolutionary success is to aid it in its quest
for truth by freely and abundantly generating a wide variety of ideas so that the best ones can
be selected for. Freedom of expression ensures variability which gives natural selection more
to choose from thus ensuring that the best ideas come to light. Huzzah for freedom of
expression!
Before I pull out the champagne and toast to the health and longevity of ideas in
support of freedom of expression, however, I must face a serious complication without which
my argument has little practical application. Namely, there are ideas that are so good at
spreading themselves within a group that they are favored by natural selection simply
because of their circulatory success. I will follow the terminology Dawkins introduces in The
Selfish Gene (1976) and call ideas or units of culture selected for their success in “selfishly”
propagating themselves memes. In words of Stewart-Williams, memetics forwards the idea
“that, like genes, memes are subject to natural selection, and that selection favors “selfish”
memes—memes that, through accident or design, are good at getting themselves replicated
and keeping themselves in circulation in the culture” (222). If ideas most widespread and
alive at any given time may have been selected not for how much they help us in survival,
neither for how true they are, but for how infectiously and rapidly they spread through an
existing population that presents a problem for the freedom of expression argument–the most
fashionable rather than the truest idea wins. Selfish memes are the equivalent of crocs clogs:
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crocs were extremely popular within certain groups in the past decade. Their popularity,
however, cannot be attributed to them bringing a revolutionary advantage into the shoe
industry—breathable and durable shoes have existed before and after. Moreover, they are in
no way aesthetically pleasing (beauty in this analogy serves as the truth of the fashion
industry). They were a fleeting fashion trend that enjoyed its five minutes of fame because of
good marketing and a certain quality that in a correct historic moment succeeded in infecting
the minds of consumers with the idea that they must buy a pair. Like Crocs clogs, some
selfish memes with little epistemic or survival value become popular merely due to being
infectious enough at a certain historic moment. They range from harmless but deeply
erroneous value judgements such as “buying my friend a pair of crocs is a great idea,” to
more serious misconceptions such as “all women are bad at mathematics, chess, and
leadership,” and lastly include selfish memes with horrific consequences such as the
super-spreading ideas that paved the way for the Holocaust in the 20th century. Threatened by
such infectious and potentially harmful memes, we cannot rely simply on increasing the
variability of ideas and letting natural selection bring us to truth.
Indeed, we cannot. While some may see selfish memes as a reason for censorship,
however, I argue that controlling memetic evolution with educational techniques is by far the
better way. For as long as we have lived and competed as groups, we have developed
techniques for truth-discernment that help contain and prevent spreads of selfish memes.
Stewart-Williams refers to these as “cultural mechanisms that reliably favor truth over
catchiness” and lists “critical thinking, careful observation, peer review, open discussion,
independent replication, and the rejection of authority, tradition, and revelation as reliable
sources of knowledge” (268). The scientific method as the culmination of such techniques
therefore helps us curb the reign of selfish memes and stick to the truth. The promotion of the
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scientific method through education best helps us to stay on the evolutionary track of survival
and truth and prevents selfish memes from slowing us down or drawing us into extinction.
Fighting selfish memes with education is preferable to censoring them because censorship
leaves their infectious nature and spreading potential intact. Education, on the other hand, by
revealing the vacuous selfishness of a selfish meme damages its capacity to spread. By
reminding us we have a vested interest in pursuing truth, the scientific method gives us the
motivation and the skills necessary for controlling the evolution of ideas in our society.
We need freedom of expression to give our pool of ideas sufficient variability so that
the most useful and the truest ideas can come to light. However, since every vessel of ideas
has the potential to succumb to harmful yet superspreading kinds of selfish memes, we need
to pair freedom of expression with vested efforts to help thinkers acquire the skills necessary
for applying the scientific method to separating truth from falsity. We may even be
evolutionarily inclined to develop reliable truth-discernment techniques overtime whether or
not we consciously pursue it: recent analyses of historical examples (Henrich, 2022) and
experimental studies (Thompson et al., 2022) support the notion that evolutionary principles
of variation and selection play important roles in developing, filtering, and preserving
complex human knowledge systems. Whether it develops spontaneously or not, careful,
analytical, and evidence-based reasoning is necessary for the success of our species as it
helps us cripple the spreading mechanisms of infectious but false ideas while increasing the
evolutionary success of the truth. Censorship merely shuts our eyes to the threat of infectious
and false ideas and drives them underground where they await favorable historic
circumstances in which they will once again wreak havoc on humankind.
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PART 2: WHY EXPRESSION IS DIFFICULT TO REGULATE
A. A Brief Overview of Legal Restrictions of Expression
1. International Law
On an international level, freedom of expression and its limitations are outlined in
Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
According to Article 19 of ICCPR, freedom of expression “carries with it special duties and
responsibilities” and thus may be restricted but only by restrictions that “are provided by law
and are necessary,” namely “for respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “for the
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals” (TWG, 4).
Even though some may argue that Article 19 in allowing restrictions of expression to protect
public morals might already be too expansive, Article 20 goes even further as it requires the
prohibition of “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence” (TWG, 7). Among the ICCPR’s signatories, US,
Belgium, and Denmark have made reservations with respect to Article 20, US on the grounds
of it being unconstitutional. The ICCPR has the United Nations Human Rights Committee to
oversee its implementation. As a report of the Transatlantic Working Group points out,
however, the US in particular “tends to be relatively non-receptive to the influence of
international law” (TWG, 4).
2. The United States
The US is unreceptive to international law when it comes to freedom of expression
because in no other country expression is as protected as it is in the US with the First
Amendment. The First Amendment protects even expression deemed offensive, immoral,
discriminatory, hateful, etc. In the first half of the 20th century, the Supreme Court could
constitutionally punish speech that passed a bad tendency test based on English common law.
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It allowed the Court to punish expression on the vague notion that “the natural and probable
tendency and effect of the words are such as are calculated to produce the result condemned
by the statute” (Gibson). In other words, if expression has even a tendency to incite or cause
illegal activity it may be stifled. In practice, the bad tendency test was used to eliminate
political dissent. In mid-20th century, the bad tendency test was thus replaced with the clear
and present danger test determining that it is only permissible to stifle instances of expression
that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes presents “a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” (Parker).
Furthermore, laws restricting speech such as for example libel and slander laws must abide
by the viewpoint neutrality principle that prohibits laws from discriminating against speech
based on it containing a subject matter that governmental officials disfavor.
3. The European Union
In the EU, the laws restricting expression vary from country to country. Nevertheless,
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) protects free expression
and like ICCPR emphasizes that the exercise of free expression “carries with it duties and
responsibilities” and as such may be restricted “in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary” (TWG, 5). ECHR provides a lot of grounds for limiting expression with a lot of
vague diction and the trend improves little in the regulation of individual member states.
A 2017 report of ARTICLE 19, for example, looked at the legal framework and
practices related to ‘hate speech’ regulation in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland and
the UK. They have found “widespread deficiencies” in national regulatory frameworks from
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issues with their “compatibility with applicable international freedom of expression
standards” to “inconsistencies in the application of existing legislation” (4). The flaws in
legislation, according to the report writers, have serious consequences as they “render the
legal framework open to political abuse, including against precisely those minority groups
that the law should protect” (4). While in the US, some voice complaints and frustration at
the First Amendment for too narrowly construing conditions of expression restriction, the
EU’s frustration has largely to do either with laws restricting too much speech or restricting
speech in an unfair, politically-motivated way.
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B. What Speech Regulation Should Look Like
The biggest difference between the US and EU speech regulation are the grounds
upon which regulation is permitted. Even the most stringent defendants of freedom of speech
agree that expression ought to be restricted when its restriction prevents a directly caused and
significantly pernicious harm—such a standard is reflected in the clear and present danger
test. While there is disagreement on what kind of expression qualifies for restriction on such
grounds, it tends to focus on the prevention of serious harm. Many, however, believe that not
only harmful but offensive and hateful speech warrant restriction—the most illustrative
example of the latter are hate speech laws in Europe. Setting aside the question of what kind
of legal practice generates most desirable results, there is a difficult theoretical discussion to
have about what kind of expression warrants regulation and why. A comprehensive
examination of all the factors relevant to defining the ideal limits of free expression would
require a much lengthier analysis that would include topics such as the nature of language
and causality, the nature and role of the government, and would posit a definitive definition
of terms such as harm, offense, and hate. I will likely not be able to do justice to all the
nuances of the matter. I hope, however, to offer a compelling argument for why principles
regulating speech should be construed as narrowly as possible in the way more akin to Mill’s
Harm Principle than modern, especially European, expansive speech-regulating legislation.
I plan to examine harm, offense, and hatred as grounds for restricting expression and
interrogate the main challenges that plague those who wish to define what kind of expression
qualifies as harm-causing, offense-inducing, or hate-spreading in a way that warrants
restriction. In discussing harm, I will build on Mill’s Harm Principle to extract three standards
that I will defend as both necessary and sufficient conditions for regulating speech on the
grounds of either harm, offense, or hate: A. The Severity Standard, B. The Direct Causality
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Standard, and C. The Last Resort Standard. After outlining what kind of speech satisfies the
three standards when it comes to harm, I will turn to offense and interrogate it through the
same principles. I will first draw on Feinberg’s position in Offense to Others to discuss the
way the three standards are applicable to offense and then address an important objection that
regulating offensive expression is a matter of setting community standards and does not need
to fulfill such strict standards that may more sensibly apply to harmful speech. In discussing
hate, I will draw inspiration from Jeremy Waldron’s argument from The Harm in Hate Speech
to make a case for justifying the regulation of expression even when it does not satisfy the
Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort standards. I hope to demonstrate that relative to
the importance of freedom of expression, only the expression satisfying the three standards
warrants regulation. Any attempt to disregard or loosen up a standard becomes overinclusive
and opens up the door for misapplication that leads to severe encroachments on fundamental
human liberties.
1. Harm
Even the most passionate advocates of free speech recognize the importance of
restricting expression that leads to harm. At the beginning of On Liberty, for example, Mill
identifies harm to others as the only valid reason for governmental interference with
individual liberties: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (80). Known
as the Harm Principle, this guideline comes as a result of Mill’s arguments for the value of
free speech and highlights the importance of free expression—no matter how offensive,
upsetting, mean, and disgraceful expression can be, it may not be infringed upon unless it
causes harm to others. To apply the Harm Principle to real life situations, however, it requires
further elaboration. Most importantly, its vague initial formulation calls for defining harm and
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for discussing what kinds of harms warrant restriction. If defined too loosely, the Harm
Principle could be seen as suggesting that restriction of speech is due even if it causes only
the slightest emotional discomfort i.e when a mother tells her daughter that she is behaving
poorly and by doing so “hurts her feelings.” If restricted too narrowly, however, it may only
allow for prohibiting speech that causes an exorbitant amount of physical harm such as for
example an exclamation that incites a mob to rampage. While freedom of speech is a very
important liberty, it would be too inconsiderate to deny protection to victims of harsh verbal
abuse or to those who suffer a less tangible harm such as serious harm to reputation inflicted
by slander or libel. To strike the right balance, I will begin by discussing the definition of
harm and then forward three standards for determining whether a harm caused by expression
is of the kind that warrants restriction.
I. What Counts as Harm?
Today we recognize several different kinds of harm. The main most clearly distinct
two types are physical harm such as, for example, bodily injury and psychological harm that
manifests itself in a decrease in mental health. However, there are also more abstract harms
such as the previously mentioned harm to one’s reputation, honor, credibility, and so forth.
While the harm-types differ greatly, they all have in common the fact that the victim of harm
suffers a setback to his interest. Therefore, a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient)
condition for harm to occur, is a setback to the victim’s interests. For example, if someone
stabs me, I am harmed because before the incident I was better off with regards to my interest
in bodily health. Similarly, when I undergo psychological harm, I come out of an experience
worse off with regards to my interest in being of sound and stable mind.
The inclusion of psychological harm under harm has not always been thought
self-evident. Mill, for example, in explaining his Harm Principle focuses mostly on the
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occurrence of concrete, clearly recognisable physical harm. In the third chapter of On Liberty,
Mill points out that in some circumstances, speech can no longer be protected as a mere
self-regarding action: “even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act” (121). In such situations opinions become actions because it is evident from
the circumstances of their expression that they do not aim to spur discussion but rather cause
an action. As an example, Mill offers an expression of the opinion that “corn-dealers are
starvers of the poor” (121) expressed to an excited mob in front of a corn-dealer’s house. The
same opinion may be printed in newspapers or brought up in a debate, however, due to the
specific circumstance of its expression, it becomes as significant of a causal factor as an
action would be. Because it causes an outburst of violence, expressing such an opinion
violates the obligation to do no harm and may therefore be prevented or punished. In contrast,
Mill is not eager to apply the Harm Principle to psychological distress caused by critique and
disagreement: “if the test be offense to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience
testifies that this offense is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful” (118).
Admittedly, it is unclear whether Mill does not see the Harm Principle as applicable to
offense because he does not recognize psychological harm or because he merely believes that
most often non-physical harm is not of sufficient severity to warrant speech-restriction. On
either reading, however, the Harm Principle presents harm as a necessary but not sufficient
reason for limiting speech.
II. What Kinds of Harm Count?
When a harm occurs as a consequence of speech, it does not mean that said speech
may be restricted. To define the conditions that expression must satisfy in order to warrant
regulation, I will lay out three standards any instance of expression must satisfy in order to
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warrant prohibition. They are inspired by the essential traits of Mill’s corn-dealer example
that render the expression “corn-dealers are starvers of the poor,” (121) a clear example of
speech that may be interfered with to prevent harm to others.
A. The Severity Standard
In the corn-dealers example, a lot is at stake if the inciteful speech is permitted. An
enraged mob will not only cause significant material damage but will likely murder the corn
dealer and his family. The harm that the state would be preventing by prohibiting expression
of a speaker inciting a mob is significant and severe. As Mill’s case suggests, a Severity
Standard of some sort is necessary to rule out trivial instances in which the harm afflicted is
not proportionate to the significance of infringing upon someone’s liberty to express himself.
For example, voicing a critique of Kim Jong-Un’s way of governing North Korea may indeed
tarnish the dictator’s reputation, but such a harm is in no way severe enough to warrant a
country-wide ban on expressing political opinions. Freedom to express oneself is too
important of a liberty for an individual’s personal autonomy and a healthy public discourse to
restrict it when it causes only a minor harm. Indeed, it is a matter of interpretation what
passes as severe harm. To the rulers of the North Korean regime questioning the dictator may
very well seem severe. In order to mitigate such relativity of perception, it may be best to
define as severe only those instances of harm in which the setback to the victim’s interests is
such that it causes a significant disruption to the harmed party’s regular course of life.
B. Direct Causality Standard
Another important aspect of the corn-dealer’s example is that due to the temporal and
spatial proximity between the objectionable expression and the occurrence of harm there is
no doubt that the mob’s violence was directly caused by inciteful speech. Direct Causality
Standard requires harm to be directly caused by the speech in question—most often the
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standard is satisfied when harm occurs immediately after the speech and in a close spatial
proximity to the speaker. Such a standard helps rule out cases in which the causal connection
between an expression of an idea and an occurrence of a harm is at best questionable. If, for
example, the speaker of the inciteful sentence was to express it in a passionate rant to a fellow
villager over a pint of beer, and then said villager was to go and murder the corn-dealer later
that same evening, we would have little ground to restrict that same speech—the most
proximal cause of the harm is the villager’s decision to murder rather than the speech that
inspired him to do so. Historically, the government and religious authorities have frequently
prohibited expression of certain ideas which they believed might be causally connected to a
certain future harm: for example, Goethe’s novel The Sorrows of Young Werther was for a
time taken out of circulation because it was believed to cause a spike in suicide in young
people. As recently as in the first half of the 20 th century, the US Supreme Court could
constitutionally punish speech on the vague notion that it may cause some harm or in other
words, that “the natural and probable tendency and effect of the words are such as are
calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute” (Gibson). In practice, this
loosened standard became an excuse to prosecute political opponents with anti-war
sentiments. The Direct Causality Standard is therefore necessary not only because without it,
the causal connection between expression and harm becomes too weak, but also because
removing it allows for political abuse.
C. The Last Resort Standard
Finally, the corn-dealer example offers a case in which prohibiting or preventing
expression is clearly the last method available for preventing the occurrence of harm. For
example, the excited mob in Mill’s example is in a very emotional state—enraged and excited
it waits only for someone to yell “Go!” and give them an excuse to attain a premeditated goal
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and punish the corn-dealer. Their rampage does not come as a consequence of a calm and
rational decision to harm the corn-dealer, because a speaker brought to their attention that the
corn-dealer is harming them. Because the deliberative content of inciteful speech does not
matter to the mob, no amount of debate would be able to mitigate the effects of the
exclamation “corn-dealers are starvers of the poor” (Mill, 121). Since prohibiting the
expression of said idea is the only way of preventing the mob from rampaging, prohibition is
permissible. The Last Resort Standard dictates that only when other options such as debate
would be ineffective, expression may be curtailed by censorship. Without a respect for such a
standard, regulation of speech rather than discussion becomes a go-to method of generating
compliance. As censorship prevalent on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter
may suggest, the prohibition of speech appears to be an easy way to deal with potentially
harm-inspiring opinions that enter the public forum. It is by no means, however, better than
exposing opinions that may inspire violence as false by providing better, more persuasive
arguments against them. Only by treating censorship and prohibition as a last-resort tool, we
honor the value of freedom of expression and avoid stifling it in pursuit of an unachievable
level of safety.
III. Objection: We Should Err on the Side of Safety
When it comes to discussing harms caused by expression, many might have an
intuition that it is better to be safe than sorry and overregulate rather than underregulate and
allow harm to occur as a result of expression—even if expression is not the most direct cause
of not even necessarily all that severe a harm. In other words, some believe that we should
prohibit and censor a bit more expression than strictly necessary to prevent harm. The idea is
that making someone shut up about certain kinds of topics that are likely to lead to violence is
a small price to pay to avoid the suffering that might ensue. Moreover, very often the
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potentially harm-causing expression has little informative or enlightening value for public
discourse: why should people be free to express, for example, a disdain over existence so
profound that it inspires suicide in their readers or, for instance, to rage against authorities or
certain groups of people with a language so powerful that it incites their listeners to spread
hatred and violence in their own lives? Surely, not much value is lost in sacrificing certain
topics, ideas, or words for the common good?
While the desire to ensure greater public safety is admirable and natural, sacrificing
freedom to discuss some ideas or topics in pursuit of public safety is ill-conceived. It violates
individual autonomy in much the same way as if the government was to constantly monitor
all its citizens’ conversations so as to prevent any scheming of illegal activity. As
autonomous human beings with rights and dignity, we ought to be free to think and discuss
even offensive, daring, morally comprehensible, and “dangerous” ideas. No one should have
the right to interfere with the most fundamental processes of our individuality such as
thinking and expressing our thoughts. Because of its importance for the exercise of individual
liberty, we must not regulate expression based on the topic and content but only based on the
situational aspects of expression that render it too great a threat to public safety to tolerate. As
Mill points out in On Liberty, “no one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions”
(121). In censoring expression, we thus ought to stick narrowly to the kind of expression that
because of its situational context attains the nature of an action as its direct consequence is an
occurrence of severe harm that nothing but the expression could cause because nothing, but
the censorship of expression can prevent it.
IV. Limitations of the Three Standards
I propose the Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort standard as the best
compromise between addressing the unwanted consequences speech may have while keeping
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the most expression possible out of the reach of governmental authorities. Nevertheless, they
cannot escape the two most problematic aspects of any law or standard that seems to plague
most regulations pertaining to speech censorship—the issue of being so vague that they can
be applied in a way that makes them overly-restrictive and the issue of not being restrictive
enough.
One way to counterbalance vagueness is by examining why certain examples satisfy
or do not satisfy the standards and therefore clarify the ideal ways of interpreting what is
“severe,” “a direct cause,” and “a last resort.” Comparing, say, Mill’s corn-dealer case with
the prohibition of regime-skeptical political expression in North Korea, however, only
clarifies the more extreme ends of a spectrum: speech that clearly may be restricted and
speech that obviously ought not to be. In between the two, however, remains a gray area of
more everyday cases in which it is admittedly extremely difficult to figure out whether the
speech is a direct cause of a severe enough consequence that cannot be prevented in other
ways than censorship. The vagueness that prohibits us from clearly determining at what point
the speech brings about a severe and proximal enough consequence is undoubtedly a
drawback of my standards, but it also makes them flexible enough to be adjusted to a wide
variety of expression-related situations. The imperfections of the judiciary system and
fast-changing culture norms indeed render any vagueness a potential loophole to abuse.
Nevertheless, I believe that the best way to safeguard freedom of expression for the future
generation while serving justice when a speech-related injury occurs, is to make sure that we
can answer in the affirmative to these three questions: 1) Is expression truly a direct cause of
the consequence? 2) Is the consequence of expression severe? and 3) Is censorship our only
option?
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On another note, I realize that there are certain situations in which speech may be
broadly viewed as reprehensible enough to be censored or punished but does not satisfy my
three standards either because the causal link is too weak or because the consequence it
brings about is not clearly or necessarily severe. For example, after school shootings we often
hear of unregulated speech platforms such as 4chan and 8chan on which shooters published
their manifestos and met others with similarly dark thoughts whose encouragement might
have influenced them to commit an atrocious act. It seems very appealing to propose
censorship and regulation of those platforms even though it is not clear that the platform
culture and users were a direct cause of the individual’s behavior. The severity of the crime is
so high that it seems very tempting to disregard the Direct Causality standard and pursue
regulation. A similar problem arises when we consider un-targeted expressions of racial slurs
and highly discriminatory discourse such as crude cartoons or scribbles on bathroom stalls
and other public areas. Such forms of expression are generally of extremely low discursive
value and wickedly exploit a painful history of racism to propagate discriminatory
sentiments. However, while deeply offensive, they are not necessarily always demonstrably
causing a severe consequence—often that apparent lack of a consequence comes due to black
people’s resilience in face of prejudice. It seems, however, that even if the targets of such
speech have learned to dismiss it and the Severity Standard is left unsatisfied, racial slurs are
so morally reprehensible that we need not tolerate them regardless of people’s sensitivities to
them.
Such examples demonstrate the primary difficulty of defending narrow
speech-regulation standards—there are going to be situations you leave out that you might
prefer not to. Many would rather see more allowing standards even if that means there are
cases of over-regulation and overly eager censorship. However, the historical arguments for
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freedom of expression that I tried to convey in the first part of my thesis by discussing
Ancient Athenians, Locke, and Mill in my opinion present a forceful and compelling case for
the instrumental and intrinsic importance of freedom of expression. Before one convinces me
that over-regulation is preferable to under-regulation, I will need to see not merely
contemporary examples but a persuasive refutation of the historical foundation on which my
case stands.

2. Offense
Even though abandoning the three standards to prevent harm may be unwise, there are
perhaps other grounds for prohibiting expression that may permit us to sufficiently expand
the array of expression that may be regulated. The proponents of expanding the government’s
regulatory privileges thus argue that not only expression that causes severe harm to others,
but also offensive expression that evokes undesirable mental states and unpleasant emotions
may be punishable by law. After all, we permit the government to legally restrict our
freedoms not only to prevent harm, but also to enforce standards in our community that make
our society more pleasant to live in. For example, there are laws regulating public urination
and defecation as well as public indecency. If such unpleasant behaviors may be prohibited
without much fuss, why would offensive expression be any different?
A wide range of expressions may cause us to take offense: from a person in the
cinema loudly making crass comments on the appearance of the lead actress, a teenager
blasting rap music with highly inappropriate lyrics on the bus, all the way to someone openly
mocking an aspect of our identity e.g. our religion, nationality, or gender. Undoubtedly,
offensive expression can be highly unpleasant; it makes us feel negative feelings such as
annoyance, disgust, shame, anxiety, or humiliation. In Offense to Others Feinberg offers an
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argument in favor of regulating offense defined as “the whole miscellany of universally
disliked mental states” (1). He forwards the offense principle which states that “It is always a
good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is probably necessary to
prevent serious offense to persons other than the actor and would probably be an effective
means to that end if enacted” (xiii). Yet just like with harm, Feinberg needs to add a series of
tests that offensive expression needs to pass in order to warrant restriction. After presenting
the difficulties with differentiating offense from harm and laying out Feinberg’s Offense
Principle, I will show how the conditions set by Feinberg correspond to the Severity, Direct
Causality, and Last Resort Standard that I set out as guidance in restricting harm.
I. The Relationship Between Harm and Offense
Some argue that we should regard offense as a genre of harm and need not consider it
separate from it. Others like Feinberg, however, wish to strictly distinguish between the two.
Feinberg wants to say that no offense should be viewed or understood as harm: “Continued
extreme offense…can cause harm to a person who becomes emotionally upset over the
offense, to the neglect of his real interests. But the offended mental state in itself is not a
condition of harm” (3). He sees his principle as one demonstrating that certain offensive, but
not harmful experiences may nevertheless be restricted: “we can rightly demand legal
protection from them even at the cost of other persons' liberties” (10). While a strict
separation between harm and offense may be useful for providing a legal principle, the two
categories are closely related in reality: harm often accompanies offensive situations even
though the causal connection between the offensive expression or behavior and harm may
often be less clear.
To dig deeper into the relationship between harm and offense, let us consider one of
the most horrifying imaginary scenarios intended to test our intuitions that Feinberg offers in
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his first chapter. Feinberg urges us to imagine an event taking place on a crowded bus that we
must take to get to our destination which means that we cannot escape the situation by
switching seats or leaving: “A passenger with a dog takes an aisle seat at your side. He or she
keeps the dog calm at first by petting it in a familiar and normal way, but then petting gives
way to hugging, and gradually goes beyond the merely affectionate to the unmistakably
erotic, culminating finally with oral contact with the canine genitals” (12). If I put myself in
such a situation, I can vividly imagine experiencing intense emotions of revulsion, horror,
and indignation. But despite the intensity of these negative feelings for the duration of the
incident, the fact that I was in an offended state of mind is not sufficient to establish that I
was harmed.
As mentioned earlier, a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition for
someone to harm me, is that he sets back my interests so that with regard to a specific
interest, I am worse off after the harm occurs than I was before it occurred. In the case of
extreme offense, the type of harm on the table is psychological harm which would require me
to come out of an experience worse off with regards to my mental health. Importantly, mental
health does not pertain to feeling a certain way in any given moment, but rather to having an
inventory of mental skills and emotional mechanisms that help me face the challenges of my
life with responses proportionate to the challenges. For example, both a mentally healthy and
a mentally unhealthy person may panic when on a plane about to crash, but only someone
whose mental health has been harmed will panic when a stranger in a parking lot loudly
bangs the car door shut. Merely going from happy to unhappy is not sufficient for
establishing psychological harm; feelings are transient and superficial whereas the health of
our psyche runs deeper and changes less quickly. Therefore, if instances of offense are to be
considered as the cause of psychological harm, it is not because they provoke negative
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feelings, but because they provoke negative feelings of such nature and intensity that they
cause a decrease in a person’s mental health.
II. The Offense Principle
While Feinberg does not see an overlap between offense and harm, he constructs his
principle for offense-regulation so narrowly that the pool of offense-evoking experiences we
are left with consists almost exclusively of instances in which offense coincides with harm.
According to Feinberg, there are several factors in need of consideration before a given
instance of offense warrants punishment and prohibition such as the objective magnitude of
the offense, whether it is possible for the offended party to avoid offense, whether the
offended party wilfully sought out the offense-inducing situation, and whether the offended
party has an abnormal susceptibility for offense. After explaining Feinberg’s four limiting
conditions I will discuss their interaction with the Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort
Standard.
i. Objective Magnitude
In order to satisfy the requirement for sufficient magnitude and objectivity, the offense
must be serious enough, namely it needs to be “caused by the wrongful (right violating)
conduct of others” (1-2). By setting a magnitude Feinberg hopes to exclude situations of
trivial offense that may be emotionally intense but do not violate any rights such as for
example the offense taken by an Italian chef when someone suggests eating pasta with
ketchup. In other words, Feinberg restricts his principle to instances in which “offense”
stands for not a subjective description of a mental state, but an objective condition that results
in a wrongful action of someone else: “In the strict and narrow sense, I am offended (or "take
offense") when (a) I suffer a disliked state, and (b) I attribute that state to the wrongful
conduct of another, and (c) I resent the other for his role in causing me to be in the state” (2).
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Similar to how suffering offense that does not occur as a result of a wrongful action ought not
be regulated, the offense principle is not applicable to situations in which the person causing
the wrongful action cannot be blamed for it (e.g. if a child pees in my pool, I cannot blame
him for it even though his actions will put me in an unpleasant mental state and will destroy
my private property).
ii. Reasonableness of Avoidability
The offense principle likewise does not apply to situations in which “the reasonable
avoidability standard” (26) is not met. Many situations that have the potential to offend us
can be easily avoided without us incurring any significant costs. For example, we can ignore
a group of demonstrators rather than engage in an argument with them, avoid visiting
pornographic sites, and not go to comedy shows of comedians whose humour might offend
us. Therefore, we ought not punish offense when the victim could have avoided the incident
without incurring great costs: “no one has a right to protection from the state against
offensive experiences if he can easily and effectively avoid them without unreasonable effort
or inconvenience” (32). Applying this condition importantly rules out the suppression of art,
books, or social media profiles on grounds of evoking offense.
iii. The Volenti Maxim
The volenti maxim establishes that someone willingly placing themselves in an
offense-evoking situation is not wronged—volenti non fit injuria.3 It excludes the malicious
versions of the situations ruled out by the reasonableness of avoidability standard in which
the offensive experience is actively sought out by “the victim.” The offended party’s
emotions may be incredibly intense and produced by a wrongful act, but if they were
voluntarily sought out no wrong happened: “The offended states induced by such voluntarily
3

Direct translation: to a willing person, an injury is not done.
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undertaken experiences are perfectly real, just as the broken bones incurred by the stunt
motorcyclist are perfectly real harms, but in neither case can the victim complain of a
grievance” (33).
iv. Discounting of Abnormal Susceptibility
In regulating offense, another factor that needs to be accounted for is the subjectivity
of susceptibility to offense. There are people, for example, who will suffer offense at the very
thought of certain kinds of ideas being in circulation or behaviors taking place and who are
thus in virtue of their predispositions unable to avoid offense. Imagine, for example, a person
offended by the mere existence of a homosexual couple living next door, or a student
appalled by the thought that a speaker invited to her campus will be sharing opinions she
finds immoral. According to Feinberg such cases do not warrant legal protection since “the
more fragile our sensitive sufferer's psyche, the less protection he can expect from the
criminal law” (34), To illustrate the issue further, Feinberg compares an overly sensitive
person to a skittish horse. We would not punish someone whose harmless activity startles
such a horse but would rather expect owners of such horses “to keep them away from
"startling" activities and to take steps to cure them of their skittishness” (34). In other words,
we cannot adjust our society to suit the comfort of every single individual—people with
deviating sensibilities have the responsibility to cope with them or adjust them on their own.
III. The Purpose of Feinberg’s Conditions
In narrowing down the conditions for regulating offense, Feinberg attempts to take
offense-regulation as far as possible from it being a matter of measuring the subjective
intensity of an individual’s emotion. He only wishes to punish the conduct that could not have
been avoided and violates not merely our norms of behavior but our rights in a way that
would put most individuals at significant unease. The conditions which he believes ought to
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be fulfilled before offensive expression warrants prohibition closely resemble the Severity,
Direct Causality, and the Last Resort Standard. First, the Objective Magnitude condition
attempts to define the graveness of the offense in a standardized way so as to avoid regulating
expression when offense is caused by subjectively upsetting but not objectively wrongful
behavior. Second and third, the two conditions mediating the behavior of the
victim—Reasonableness of Avoidability and Volenti Maxim—attempt to weed out cases in
which the causal connection between the expression and offense inflicted is very weak: both
when the victim could have easily avoided offense and when she seeks it out, the offense is
self-caused rather than the responsibility of the offender. Thus, they correspond to the Direct
Causality standard in so far as they wish to make sure that the responsibility for the negative
consequence—be it harm or offense—indeed lies with the speaker. Last, discounting
abnormal susceptibilities has much the same result as the Last Resort Standard which dictates
that censorship is permissible only when other viable options of lessening the negative result
of expression are exhausted. If a person gets offended too easily and could have avoided
intense offense by practicing mental resilience and introspection—to become less skittish, if
we borrow from Feinberg’s earlier analogy—then that is an option that needs to be
considered before censorship. With physical harm it would be pointless to demand of people
to toughen up their skin or wear protective armor all the time, however, the level of emotional
upset that occurs when someone experiences offense is much more malleable and greatly
depends on factors subject to change and interrogation such as personal resilience and
cultural norms.
IV. Objections
Once we apply the Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort Standard that may
when it comes to offense be reasonably represented by Feinberg’s four conditions, we rule
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out as unfit for regulation most of the usual instances of offense that people encounter on a
daily basis. Only the most outrageous and repeatedly occurring instances of offensive
expression pass such strict requirements: we may, for example, have grounds for penalizing a
group of passionate atheists that comes to stand in front of an Islamic Mosque every week to
yell at the service-goers extraordinarily imaginative obscenities about the prophet
Mohammed with a vehemence that would make any reasonable person uncomfortable. Many
less extreme and more commonly occurring situations, such as for example the publication of
rude cartoons about the Islamic prophet or Catholic religious figures in magazines and
newspapers or people wearing t-shirts with obscene messages clearly aimed to demean
women, however, would have to be tolerated as in both of those situations, offense can be
easily avoided. And so would tamer instances of offense-inducing expression such as people
misusing other people’s pronouns or wearing MAGA hats or communist insignias; in such
instances, offense can be discounted due to an abnormal susceptibility to hotly debated
political topics such as the issue of gender and Donald Trump. As the responses of people on
Twitter and other social media suggests, however, many desire to prohibit and punish even
not so extreme cases of offense seems relatively prevalent. I will present two arguments for
loosening the conditions for restricting offensive expression: an argument for the right of a
community to determine its own standards and an argument for the importance of kindness
and compassion.
i. Community Standards
Many might disagree with the position that only instances of severely offensive
expression that wrongs the offended party on an objectively determinable scale of magnitude
qualify for restriction. The subjectivity of offense that motivates setting such a condition,
may to some seem the very reason for why we ought not try to set objective measures of
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offense, but rather let communities decide themselves what kinds of expression they find
offensive and do not want to tolerate. Prohibiting offense, after all, is a matter of making a
community more pleasant to live by protecting its members from experiencing unwelcome
emotions evoked by offensive expression. Such a goal can be achieved only if the standards
for what is offensive are adjusted to fit the subjective experiences of community-members.
Whereas harm may be objectively quantified and regulated in the same way across
communities, offense ought to be adjusted by each group individually based on
community-input. Publications ought to listen to their readers, municipalities to their
residents, and countries to their citizens in determining and readjusting the rules about what
kind of expression is too offensive to pass. If standards of offense are not determined
somewhat democratically and adjusted to people’s opinions, there is not much point in having
them at all. After all, right-violating conduct is regulated with laws already—the only added
value of regulating offense comes if we can restrict the kinds of behavior and expression that
is not really wrongful but merely perceived as very unpleasant by a great number of
community-members.
While the idea of having a community set its own standards of offense so as to
maximize the comfort of its members is appealing, it has several flaws that make it
impossible to realize without severe violations of liberty. First, it underestimates the dangers
of mistaking a minority of loud and easily offended members for the majority opinion.
Regulating offensive expression in a way that accommodates those most susceptible to upset
often restricts free speech without a significant benefit to the common good. By giving the
most easily upset people validation, such a way of restricting expression may, as a matter of
fact, may even increase other people’s general susceptibility to offense without any valid
reason. Even if the majority in a given community is indeed offended by a specific type of
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non-wrongful expression, their desire to feel comfortable ought to not override the right of
others to express freely. Take, for example, an extremely liberal suburban community in
California in which a vast majority of people would feel horrified and upset if faced with the
views of a Trump supporter. Banning Trump-supporting discourse would certainly allow
those community members to lead more comfortable lives—at what cost though? An increase
of comfort and satisfaction of people ought not override someone’s fundamental right to
discuss their political opinions and values.
If we let communities pick and choose offensive expression regulations according to
what they are comfortable with, we not only unfairly infringe upon individual rights of
dissenters, but also potentially sacrifice important lessons about coexisting with
different-minded people. Just like an extremely conservative Catholic community might
benefit from encountering an Atheist, Californian liberals might benefit from an occasional
encounter of a Trump-supporter—regardless of whether the encounter makes the group
question or reinforce their views. Non-wrongful offensive expression rarely harms the
offended party, but it always exposes her to ideas she disagrees with. Being exposed to ideas
that go against one’s worldview, while uncomfortable in the short term, is likely to benefit
one in the long term. The regulation of offensive expression ought to be as narrow as possible
and as objective as possible to counter our tendency to engulf ourselves into thought bubbles.
Giving the majority the power to infringe upon an individual’s right to free expression
presents a risk incomparably greater to its benefits. Throughout history, expression has been
censored under the guise of causing offense. For example, in 1885 a journalist named W. T.
Stead exposed a child slave trafficking ring in an article. Whereas those participating in child
prostitution were not sanctioned, Stead was condemned to a year-long imprisonment for
“writing about an indecent subject” (Feinberg, 5). Communities can inevitably enforce
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standards of expression to an extent by applying social pressure on on-conformers, but they
ought not be allowed to infringe upon their members’ fundamental liberties any more
concretely.
ii. The Value of Kindness
An alternative objection to the very strictly limited regulation of offensive expression
that Feinberg and I advocate for may counter the idea that we ought to discount people with
abnormal susceptibilities to offense in determining what expression is offensive enough to
deserve prohibition. One may argue that defining what counts as abnormal is in itself
extremely subjective and dubious. For example, if we view as abnormally susceptible to
offense only those individuals who deviate from the median level of upset in a given
community at a certain time, who is to say that their upset is not more adequate than that of
everyone else? In Nazi Germany, for example, the median level of offense at antisemitic
expression was likely quite low and yet we might want to say that those “abnormally
susceptible to offense” had better instincts in said case. Alternatively, if we define abnormal
susceptibility to offense as a deviation from a less specifically determined median, are we to
include the upset levels of all communities from all cultures and eras? Even in the same
historical period, the susceptibility to offense when it comes to, for example, sexist
expression, will vary drastically between cultures and ages—what an American college
student might perceive as grossly offensive may be viewed as completely normal by an older
person from rural Romania. Instead of trying to objectify the norms for regulating offensive
expression, we ought to accept the inherent subjectivity of offense and adjust norms in ways
that protects all people from extremely unpleasant situations, regardless of whether their
susceptibility is average or not. We ought to be kind and at least to a certain degree make
accommodations even for those who do not fit into the norm. Very often people have an
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abnormal susceptibility towards offense on certain topics because of the unique hardships
they have endured in their lives. Transgender individuals, for example, might be much more
upset by someone who mis-genders another individual or someone who argues that we
should be free to address people with the pronouns that match their biological sex rather than
their chosen ones. Especially when a minority develops a susceptibility to get offended by
certain topics, we ought to put their humanity first and treat them with kindness by adjusting
the norms of expression in a way that respects their abnormal susceptibilities.
While I believe in the importance of showing kindness and compassion towards the
most vulnerable members of our community, I see protecting their right to free expression as
much more important for their well-being than shielding them from the discomfort of
encountering offense. First, I want to acknowledge that there indeed are challenges with
determining what level of susceptibility counts as abnormal. The challenge of defining what
is normal, reasonable, and average for legal purposes, however, is overcome by the court
judging each case individually against the legal fiction of how the reasonable individual, or in
Roman times the bonus pater familias would respond if in the shoes of the offended party.
Indeed, we cannot define the limits of normal susceptibility to offense on the spot, just as it
would be difficult to present an abstract definition of negligence that could be used in all
future judgements of negligence cases. However, that does not mean that discounting
abnormal susceptibility to offense in cases of offense or looking for abnormally careless
behavior in negligence cases cannot produce a just outcome.
While it is extremely important to show kindness and compassion to those who need
it most, we cannot accommodate everyone if we want laws to remain just. People with
abnormal susceptibilities to offense may indeed have extremely valid reasons for their
feelings, but that does not mean that it is the duty of the world to legally recognize their
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experience at the cost of other people’s fundamental liberties. If we were to make our duty to
predict for any possible level of abnormal susceptibility to offense when speaking, we could
hardly express anything of significance. The topics we ought to spend time discussing are
often the most controversial and challenging ones to discuss. It may be our moral duty to
express kindness by offering emotional support to those most affected by difficult subjects
and accommodating their sensitivities to an extent, however, we ought not—for their sake as
well as ours—shy away from rigorous and daring debate that questions ideas and pushes
them to their extremes. The progress of social justice for the most vulnerable individuals after
all depends on people’s right to use their voice to challenge the status quo. Restricting
offensive expression is thus against the interests those who deviate most from the median:
adjusting an expression-restricting norm in a way that accounts for the subjectivity of
emotion also renders the law much more malleable and thus renders it a tool with which the
majority can stifle less popular ideas. While encountering offensive expression may be very
upsetting to people, their interests are much more infringed upon and disrespected if their
right to free expression is not rigorously protected.

3. Hate
Perhaps the most controversial category of speech that many wish to restrict is hateful
expression more commonly referred to as hate speech. Hate speech is notoriously difficult to
define but those against it most often describe it as words expressing a speaker’s hateful
attitude towards the target of his speech and expression which regardless of whether or not it
communicates a hateful intention supposedly increases hateful attitudes towards its targets.
These two conditions, frustratingly, are neither necessary nor sufficient for defining
something as hate speech. Having a hateful attitude is not a sufficient condition for hate
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speech—a person can express their hatred without using hateful words by, for example,
ironically exclaiming “I just love immigrants. They’re leaving such an amazing mark on our
country.” Neither does intention seem to be a necessary condition for hate speech since
people are believed to be engaging in hate speech even when they have good intentions such
as for example when they express concern for the target group by saying “being transgender
is a mental disorder and we are doing transgender individuals a disservice by playing into
their fantasies instead of offering them psychiatric support.” Propagating or promoting hate
towards a group or a person as a standard poses similar challenges as it is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for hate speech: it cannot be necessary or else hurling racial slurs
when no one can hear you is not hate speech and it cannot be sufficient since there is
expression that increases hatred of a certain group but does not intuitively strike us as hate
speech. For example, if an advocate for transgender rights makes a well-meaning argument
about transgender athletes deserving to compete in the category of their chosen gender in
front of a very conservative audience, he might actually increase the audience’s level of
hatred for transgender individuals without engaging in hate speech. Despite the difficulties in
establishing a definition of hate speech, however, many laws and guidelines have been put
forth in a desire to restrict a broad range of expression from “fake” news, speech that is
upsetting due to depictions of violence, speech that contributes to “extremist” ideas, speech
that mocks religion or “traditional family values,” all the way to speech that makes members
of a certain group, particularly a minority anxious, uncomfortable, or offended.
In the following pages I will discuss specifically this latter form of “hate speech” that
I will for clarity’s sake refer to as minority defamation. I will define minority defamation as
speech falsely attributing a negative trait to a group of people in the minority. By “falsely
attributing” I want to refer to not merely the act of forwarding an entirely false proposition
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about a group of people such as “Jewish people are vermin” but also the dissemination of
partial truths that are overexaggerated in order to harm a group’s reputation, for example,
“Mexicans are criminals”—there certainly exist criminals of Mexican descent but the
proposition is a form of minority defamation because it attempts to extend a negative trait
true for some to all members of the group. I have decided to discuss minority defamation
because the argument for restricting it is common, popular, and seems to be viewed as very
persuasive even though it directly clashes with the Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort
standards that I view as necessary conditions for speech restriction. With the help of Jeremy
Waldron’s argument in The Harm in Hate Speech I will present a case for restricting speech
that does not have a severe negative consequence caused directly by the expression in
question that could be addressed by discussion rather than censorship. Because of the
negative and unjust long-term state of affairs minority defamation contributes to, legally
censoring it is forwarded not only as justifiable but as a moral duty of any fair democratic
government.
Expression that may be defined as minority defamation consists of various statements
with various levels of objectionability from “Muslims are terrorists” and “transgender people
are crazy” to “blonde women are stupid.” Many argue that minority defamation presents a
serious threat to the minorities in question. Waldron views the problem of minority
defamation as a form of harm deeply problematic because it endangers the minority
member’s rights as equal citizens: “The issue is publication and the harm done to individuals
and groups through the disfiguring of our social environment by visible, public, and
semipermanent announcements to the effect that in the opinion of one group in the
community, perhaps the majority, members of another group are not worthy of equal
citizenship” (33). The minorities targeted by defamation are, according to Waldron,
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condemned to a life of fear: “Can their lives be led, can their children be brought up, can their
hopes be maintained, and their worst fears dispelled, in a social environment polluted by
these materials?” (33). Waldron’s concerns hint at the following argument:
1. Minority defamation communicates a negative sentiment of a group of people—often
the majority.
2. Associating a negative sentiment with a group of people is equivalent to considering
said group less deserving of equal citizenship.
3. (from 1 & 2) Minority defamation leads a group of people—often the majority, to
consider a minority group less deserving of equal citizenship.
The greatest weakness of this brief argument lies in the second premise. Attributing
any negative trait to someone certainly cannot be construed as equal to proposing that they be
stripped of their citizenship rights: there are many negative traits such as laziness, stupidity,
greed, and promiscuity that have previously been attributed to African-Americans, women,
Jewish people, and the members of LGBT community and they have nothing to do with
citizenship rights. We may not be fond of lazy, stupid, greedy, and promiscuous members of
our society, but these traits do not imply that they ought to be treated differently as citizens.
However, there are some characterizations such as being a rapist, a terrorist, a thief, and a
crazy person in which there is implicit a suggestion that certain restriction of freedoms are
due. Perhaps the idea is that the most pernicious forms of minority defamation are those
which make the accusations with the most implications for a different treatment.
Nevertheless, a more accurate and more modest second premise, would stop at proposing that
associating a negative sentiment with a group of people is equivalent to proposing that they
be treated differently. Proposing that a group of people is lazy, stupid, greedy, and
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promiscuous indeed implies that they ought to be treated with greater caution and are
deserving of less confidence and trust than others.
On both interpretations of the second premise minority defamation is taken to
compromise a group’s right to equal treatment. Waldron forwards an argument that strives for
a more ambitious conclusion, namely, that a minority group’s rights to equal citizenship are
endangered. However, to an extent his way of reasoning is equally applicable in its more
modest formulation which links minority defamation with worse treatment. In both cases, the
idea is that a certain genre of expression deprives minorities of an important public good: the
assurance that they are equal members of a community, namely “that they can count on being
treated justly” (85). Waldron understands one’s lack of assurance in the strong sense of the
term—as a threat to one’s citizenship rights that manifests in one’s different treatment by
authorities in front of the law. He believes that having Assurance (S) means having a
guarantee of being treated equally by the law. With my amendment to earlier premise 2,
however, I understand lack of assurance in its weaker sense, namely as a threat to one’s equal
treatment by one’s fellow citizens. I will refer to my usage of the term as assurance (W),
defined as having a guarantee of being treated equally by one’s fellow citizens.
For Waldron, Assurance (S) is an essential trait of a just society that can be
characterized as an underlying confidence of its citizens in the fact that their rights will be
respected. He understands preserving Assurance (S) as key to protecting people’s dignity in
front of the law by ensuring that everyone has the same “social standing” and a “basic
reputation” that ensures that people “be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of
society” (5) such as the society’s legal procedures. Under my view, however, assurance (W)
is an essential trait of an ideally just society, not a just society. In the best of all possible
worlds, a person must indeed have assurance (W) that no matter whom they encounter, they
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will have the same social standing, the same basic reputation, and be treated as equal
regardless of his or her belonging to a certain identity group. In reality, however, in-group and
out-group ways of thinking, further reinforced by stereotypes, influence the way we respond
to and treat other people. While a perfectly just society is indeed one in which every single
action of every single person is perfectly just, it is sufficient for a just society that it has laws
ensuring the protection of people’s rights even if individuals within it treat each other
differently based on them belonging to a certain group. In plain terms, in a just society people
are free to prefer some groups over others and to an extent display said preferences in their
behavior. They may not, however, infringe upon people’s fundamental liberties and
citizenship rights.
In summary, having Assurance (S) is a necessary condition of a just society as it
means knowing that you will be viewed as equal to any other citizen in front of the law. On
the other hand, assurance (W) is a necessary condition of a perfectly just society but is not
necessary for a just society as it refers to knowing that you will be viewed as equal to any
other citizen by any other citizen.
Waldron wishes to argue that minority defamation undermines people’s Assurance (S)
in two ways. First, he emphasizes that even without infringing on their legal rights, minority
defamation strips people of feeling secure in their daily lives due to the threat of being
verbally attacked or excluded when they go about their daily business: “A vigilant police
force and a Justice Department may still keep people from being attacked or excluded, but
they no longer have the benefit of a general and diffuse assurance to this effect, provided and
enjoyed as a public good, furnished to all by each” (85). While valid, this consideration does
not pertain to Assurance (S) but rather to assurance (w) as it does not bring up a concern
regarding people’s legal rights being respected. Rather, it discusses their experience of social
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ostracization. Second, Waldron asserts that minority defamation provides “a focal point for
the proliferation and coordination of the attitudes” behind hateful expression and “a public
manifestation of hatred by some people to indicate to others that they are not alone in their
racism or bigotry” (95). As such, Waldron understands minority defamation as something that
presents a true threat to Assurance (S) as it keeps alive the threat that one day majority
members motivated by the associations that they have of minorities with negative sentiments
will vote minorities out of their rights.
Motivated by such a concern, Waldron proposes that we impose expression-regulation
as a way to prevent the potential aggregation of negative sentiments to the extent that would
tip over the public opinion in favor of stripping minorities of their rights. Laws against
minority defamation are necessary, according to Waldron, to protect an “environmental good”
of allowing minorities to live without fear of systemic oppression and maintaining “a certain
ecology of respect, dignity, and assurance” by restricting speech which pollutes such goods
(96). He compares regulating group defamation to regulating CO2 emissions in order to
protect the environment: “we figure that the tiny impacts of millions of actions—each
apparently inconsiderable in itself—can produce a large-scale toxic effect that, even at the
mass level, operates insidiously as a sort of slow acting poison” (97). Even though an
individual instance of minority defamation may not clearly cause a severe negative effect, the
threat of the aggregate catastrophe just like climate change not only allows but calls for legal
action.
Waldron’s Assurance (S) Argument may be summarized as follows:
1. Minority defamation allows a group of people—potentially the majority—to
proliferate, coordinate, and publicize their negative sentiments of minority members.
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2. Associating a negative sentiment with a group of people is equivalent to considering
said group less deserving of equal citizenship.
3. (from 1 & 2) Minority defamation allows a group of people—potentially the
majority—to proliferate, coordinate, and publicize their view that a minority group is
less deserving of equal citizenship.
4. Proliferating, coordinating, and publicizing views that a minority group is less
deserving of equal citizenship keeps alive the possibility that the majority will vote in
favor of stripping a minority group of equal citizenship.
5. (from 3 & 4) Minority defamation keeps alive the possibility that the majority will
vote in favor of stripping a minority group of equal citizenship rights.
6. A just society has a duty to legally restrict anything that endangers an environmental
good of all citizens being equal with regards to their rights.
7. Activities that keep alive the possibility that the majority will vote in favor of
stripping a minority group of equal citizenship rights endanger the environmental good
of equality.
8. (from 6 & 7) A just society has a duty to legally restrict activities that keep alive the
possibility that the majority will vote in favor of stripping a minority group of equal
citizenship.
9. (from 5 & 8) A just society has a duty to legally restrict minority defamation.
As discussed earlier, Waldron’s entire argument relies on a false second premise.
Associating a negative trait with a minority group is not equivalent to proposing that they be
stripped of equal citizenship. We can, however, drastically restrict the domain of minority
defamation Waldron’s argument and argue it applies only to those instances of minority
defamation in which traits attributed such as criminality and terrorism indeed have a closer
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connection to right-restriction. Even if we do so, Waldron’s argument faces another
fundamental problem with premise #6. A just society certainly has a duty to legally restrict
that which compromises the good of all citizens to be equal with regards to their rights.
Having a duty to protect an environmental good, however, implies a much greater level of
government intrusion. To protect a good of equality, one must prohibit the violations of
equality. Protecting an environmental good of equality, on the other hand, requires a
prohibition or at least a severe restriction of all the minute things such as actions, attitudes,
and thoughts that may in aggregate present a violation. Moreover, according to Waldron,
protecting this environmental good justifies restricting free expression—a fundamental
human liberty. According to the environmental analogy, what Waldron proposes is therefore
comparable not so much to taxing CO2 emissions as it is comparable to restricting
fundamental human liberties such as the right to reproduce and travel around freely due to the
contribution said lifestyle choices make to climate change.
I do not wish to challenge Waldron’s proposition that a society has a duty to take care
of an environmental good of equality. Proposing that it is a duty to restrict actions that
contribute to the endangerment of said environmental good, however, is too radical a
proposal for as vague a requirement as it is “to contribute” to the pollution of an
environmental good. Moreover, placing a duty to protect the environmental good of equality
through prohibition of expression that contributes to it is equivalent to saying that it is our
duty to restrict CO2 emissions through travel bans and second child taxes—it is way too
narrow. Just as we can address climate change through transitioning to cleaner energy
sources, we can address intolerance and inequality through education. We not only can but
ought to develop cleaner energy sources and education strategies before we even think about
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interfering with people’s fundamental liberties such as expression, reproduction, and freedom
of movement.
Waldron certainly goes too far both in attributing too great of an effect to expression
that speaks pejoratively of a minority group and in attributing to steep a duty to the society in
order to remain just. However, perhaps there is a way to salvage the spirit of his argument
without saying that “Asians drive poorly” implies that Asian people do not deserve equal
rights as citizens and without assuming that it is a duty (or a right) of a government to ensure
the protection of vaguely construed environmental goods at the expense of fundamental
human rights. To see where a slightly more modest Assurance Argument takes us, I will
return to my reformulation of premise #2 based on the weaker sense of the term “assurance.”
A less ambitious version of the assurance (W) argument would go as follows:
1. Minority defamation allows a group of people—potentially the majority—to
proliferate, coordinate, and publicize their negative sentiments of minority members.
2. Associating a negative sentiment with a group of people is equivalent to proposing
that said group of people ought to be treated differently when encountered.
3. (from 1 & 2) Minority defamation allows a group of people—potentially the
majority—to proliferate, coordinate, and publicize their views that a minority group
ought to be treated differently when encountered.
4. Proliferating, coordinating, and publicizing views that a minority group ought to be
treated differently when encountered makes the majority treat the minority group
members differently when encountered.
5. (from 3 & 4) Minority defamation makes the majority treat the minority group
members differently when encountered.
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Thus far, the argument runs relatively smoothly. It is not outrageous to propose that
repeatedly attributing a negative attribute to a group leads to some people adopting it as fact
and altering their behavior towards the slandered group’s members. Proliferation,
coordination, and publication of defamatory views further increases the likelihood that
majority group members will indeed treat minority members differently because of holding
certain beliefs about them. From this moment in the argument, however, we must necessarily
change the environmental good that is being endangered from one pertaining to the minority
member’s rights to one pertaining to them being treated differently by people when going
about their daily business.
6. A just society may legally restrict anything that endangers an environmental good of
all citizens being treated as equal by their fellow citizens.
7. Activities that make the majority treat the minority group members differently when
encountered endanger the environmental good of equal treatment.
8. (from 6 & 7) A society may legally restrict activities that make the majority treat the
minority group members differently when encountered.
9. (from 5 & 8) A society may legally restrict minority defamation.
This version of the argument generates a mere permission rather than a duty for a
society to legally restrict minority defamation. Such a weaker conclusion seems to co-align
with a lot of people’s intuitions about restricting these kinds of hate speech. Namely, many
believe that if the statements made about a vulnerable group of people are extremely
demeaning and spread misconceptions about the minority group that negatively affect
people’s treatment of its members, they deserve punishment and restriction for making the
minority group members’ lives unnecessarily unpleasant. The circulation of racist and
homophobic stereotypes, for example, according to such a line of reasoning deserves
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prohibition because it leads to perfectly legal actions that nevertheless can be viewed as
extremely disrespectful such as security guards trailing a black teenager in a clothing store or
parents instructing their child not to be friends with a boy adopted by a gay couple.
While superficially alluring, however, this second version of the Assurance Argument
faces challenges as well. The remodeling of the second premise might have worked well, but
premise #6 forwards a much more radical proposition than it may appear initially. It proposes
that there is nothing wrong with a society legally dictating not only that people respect each
other’s rights but that they respect each other equally in everyday activities. We certainly
have a moral obligation to treat our fellow citizens equally regardless of their identity
attributes such as religion, race, or skin color. However, it is not the government’s place to
legally restrict all immoral actions. Treating others with less respect and trust or with greater
suspicion and distaste because of their personal circumstance might be extremely morally
condemnable, but it ought not be rendered illegal because doing so would violate
fundamental liberties of thinking freely and freely associating with people you like.
My objection to premise #6 might appear too cold-hearted. However, I am not saying
that the government has no business ensuring its citizens treat each other with respect, merely
that they have no business legally micromanaging people’s attitudes towards each
other—most of all they have no justification legally restricting attitudes at the level of
expression and not even action. It is important that the government invests efforts into
facilitating social harmony among its citizens, but it must do so by way of education rather
than coercion. By educating everyone about the culture and history of different minority
groups and presenting the minorities as having an enriching rather than a threatening
influence on the dominant culture, the government can encourage respect without forcing it
upon its citizens which is often more effective in the long term. The environmental good of
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equal treatment on an intrapersonal level is not something that a society has by default and is
taken away from it through small actions such as minority defamation. Rather, ensuring
social cohesion is something a society must actively work for by finding inventive ways to
persuade its members to learn about different cultures and view them as fellow citizens
co-creating their culture rather than foreign forces threatening it.
4. The Bane of Speech Regulation
Discussing the regulation of speech that leads to harm, offense, and hate brought to
light a recurring pattern—when viewed in abstract, the three regulatory standards that I
propose appear grossly insufficient for capturing all expression that we feel ought to be
punished and restricted. Permitting the government to meddle only with expression that
directly causes severe harm or offense that cannot be prevented by other means than
censorship seems to leave too many people unprotected from harmful, upsetting, and
unpleasant expression of others. Furthermore, because hatred for minorities is never a direct
cause of any given expression but rather forms gradually and overtime with many
contributing factors, my proposed regulatory standards leave the most vulnerable of our
society unprotected by law against the soiling of an environmental good that most people can
take for granted. In abstract, Severity, Direct Causality, and Last Resort standards seem way
too narrow.
Every attempt to expand them, however, poses a great threat to inalienable human
liberties and important societal goods. When it comes to harm, allowing for the censorship of
expression that leads to less severe, and less directly caused harm renders speech-regulation
so much more subjective that it allows for political abuses such as we have seen in the
application of the Bad Tendency test. Legally protecting people from more harm caused by
expression thus comes at the cost of their right to be active politically and express
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controversial views. Similarly, censoring offensive expression in a way that fully protects
people from extreme discomfort and upset requires rendering regulatory standards so
subjective that just about any opinion about public policy, personal values, or morality may
be prohibited because it is sure to offend someone. Legally protecting people from more than
just the most severe and outrageous offense thus comes at the cost of their right to express
their thoughts about anything that someone may strongly disagree with. Lastly, censoring
expression that shines a negative light on a minority group disallows the expression of
discontent with another group’s role in the society, judgements of other’s culture or way of
life, and the voicing of personal preferences. While expressing personal biases about a
minority group may not be morally praiseworthy, people’s ability to do so plays an important
role in a multicultural democratic society because it exposes the ways in which we are failing
to facilitate group cohesion and allows us to address our shortcomings by publicly correcting
biased views. Legally protecting minorities from hateful expression thus prevents us from
identifying areas in which efforts to facilitate social harmony and respect are most needed as
well as impedes on understanding the reasons for intragroup hatred.
The bane of regulating expression, therefore, lies in the fact that the conditions that
appear to narrow down the pool of expression subject to restriction too much are in fact the
only ones that prevent overregulation at the cost of fundamental human liberties and
important societal goods that help us forge better democracies and more tolerant and
respectful communities. Setting minimalistic standards for expression-regulation violates
popular intuitions so much precisely because it is unprecedented and counterintuitive to value
other people’s right to free expression. In a 1992 documentary Manufacturing Consent: Noah
Chomsky and the Media, Chomsky points out that “if you’re really in favor of free speech,
then you’re in favor of freedom of speech for precisely the views you despise.” Our
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completely natural tendency, however, is to wish for our own freedom of speech but not for
the freedom of those whose opinions we find most abhorrent. Only by sticking to the
Severity, Direct Cause, and Last Resort standards, we can restrict expression without
sacrificing the benefits of free expression for personal and public intellectual life.
5. The Importance of Minimal Regulation
Why would an experienced police officer need to bother with procuring a warrant
before searching a suspect’s property when the suspect all but admits to storing the murder
weapon in their bedroom? Why should secret service not gain access to information
exchanged through end-to-end encrypted messaging platforms if they know them to be a tool
of organizing terror attacks? And why should we not silence an opinion of a vaccine hesitant
public figure if we know they might lead people not to take the Covid-19 vaccine? It is
because all persons have fundamental human liberties such as the right to due process,
privacy, and freedom of expression. Such individual rights are frustrating for law enforcers,
lawmakers, and governments alike. Even regular citizens often see violating them as
justifiable in some cases and view having to respect them as an occasional annoying obstacle
to a better society. To fight against relativistic tendencies to bend principles defending
fundamental human liberties whenever convenient for us, I put my best efforts forth to
provide a comprehensive defense of freedom of speech.
As early as in Ancient Greece, freedom of speech was believed to have a positive
impact on the accuracy of Athenian communal decision-making, it instilled courage into
Athenians when going to war, and gave them a sense of self-determination. In Locke’s time,
freedom of expression was recognized for its role in allowing for freedom of thought and
belief. Some viewed it as important to the protection of human dignity as the right to private
property. Mill reintroduces and upgrades Lockean fundamentalist view of freedom of
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speech’s importance for freedom of thought by armoring it with further epistemic arguments
for the importance of free expression in truth seeking. Courage, autonomy, and truth are only
few of the many values we infringe upon when overzealously restricting free expression. In
light of the historically recognized significance of freedom of speech, the optimal way of
regulating speech is to only censor speech that satisfies the Severity, Direct Cause, and Last
Resort standard. Admittedly, there are situations in which I recognize the allure of bending
the standards for the sake of satisfying our intuitions, but I invite us to weigh the benefit of
preventing harm or offense or hatred in a specific circumstance which does not satisfy the
three standards against the harms brought about by expanding the pool of expression that the
government can infringe upon. Just as it is not worth it to abandon the due process and our
messaging privacy to catch a couple of crooks and terrorists faster, it is not worth removing
some harm, offense, and hatred from circulation if removing it opens the gateway to
censorship of information, opinion, and ultimately thought.
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C. Science and Hate Speech Regulation
1. Popular Opinion: The Neuroscience of Hate Speech
Even though neuroscience has for long studied mental phenomena related to hate
speech such as empathy, prejudice, and distrust, data from cognitive sciences has relatively
recently gained attention in the discourse about hate speech regulation. A 2018 NYT opinion
piece “The Neuroscience of Hate Speech” by a psychiatrist Richard A. Friedman
encapsulates most widely shared opinions about the “science of hate speech” that have been
even more frequently circulated during Trump’s presidency. Friedman expresses the view that
it is obvious that speech that denigrates and misrepresents a group has a connection to the
frequency of hate crimes: “You don’t need to be a psychiatrist to understand that the kind of
hate and fear-mongering that is the stock-in-trade of Mr. Trump and his enablers can goad
deranged people to action.” He presents several assertions as facts of science such as that hate
speech increases prejudice, provides a surge of stress hormones that make it hard for people
to think before they act, and dehumanizes the target group which results in the members
becoming victims of hate crime. Friedman thus argues that according to science, hate speech,
especially from a figure of authority, causally contributes to hate crimes as he dramatically
concludes “Now imagine what would happen if President Trump actually issued a call to
arms to his supporters. Scared? You should be.” I take Friedman’s column to be a good
summary of the subjective and often flawed interpretations of data that, especially in the
Trump era, many have adopted as an objective fact. Science to an extent establishes a
correlation between hate speech and hate acts, but said correlation could be mediated by a
number of factors and is by no means sufficient to establish causation. Nevertheless,
Friedman-like thinkers have been over-confidently presenting their interpretation of studies
on hate speech as grounds for speech-restricting policy.
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The propositions of Friedman’s column are popular and frequently expressed but as
far as science is concerned at best only one of the possible interpretations of the data and at
worst a plain misreading of science. Let us, for example, examine Friedman’s first
proposition: “repeated exposure to hate speech can increase prejudice.” Friedman states this
as a plain fact and refers to a series of Polish studies from 2017 for support. The study,
consisting of three separate experiments, however, paints a much more nuanced picture of
hate speech’s relation to prejudice. The first experiment measures the correlation between
self-reported exposure to hate speech and prejudice assessed by asking the participants to rate
their preferred level of distance to outgroup members: the lower the distance the less opposed
the participant is to having the outgroup member as a friend, neighbor, colleague, etc. After
analyzing the data, the scientists “did not observe any evidence of a simple relation between
frequency of exposure to hate speech and prejudice” (Soral et al, 4). More surprisingly
perhaps, those with more exposure to hate speech demonstrated lower prejudice as they
“were preferring lower distance towards outgroup members” (Soral et al, 4). One of the
possible interpretations of the latter finding is that “contact with hate speech might also have
some positive consequences (e.g., raised compassion for the victims)” (Soral et al, 4). The
second experiment aimed to establish that exposing a participant to hate speech on the spot in
an attempt to desensitize him to it increases the participant’s outgroup prejudice. The
scientists indeed confirmed their finding (which is probably what Friedman refers to) but
found no difference between the desensitized and not-desensitized group after accounting for
the participant’s prior level of sensitivity to hate speech: “after controlling for the level of
sensitivity to hate speech, the estimated difference reduced to nonsignificant, while the level
of sensitivity to hate speech significantly predicted outgroup prejudice” (Soral et al, 6). In
other words, the correlation between hate speech exposure and prejudice turned out to be
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spurious after controlling for the level of sensitivity to hate speech. The group reports a
similar phenomenon in their final experiment which replicates study 2 with anti-immigrant
attitudes rather than general prejudice: “after accounting for both mediators [sensitivity to
social norms and sensitivity to hate speech], the direct effects of exposure to hate speech on
outgroup prejudice and anti-immigrant attitudes became reversed or non-significant,
respectively” (Soral et al, 8). In brief, the study fails to establish that higher exposure to hate
speech rather than the participants’ prior traits is a good indicator of outgroup prejudice.
While the study offers interesting insight, it is not what Freidman presents it as—a scientific
proof that hate speech exposure can increase prejudice with unsaid but heavily hinted at
implications for the need for censorship.
Another concerning misinterpretation of science occurs when Friedman suggest that
public hate and fear mongering can cause violence by triggering a release of stress hormones
in people’s amygdala: “politicians like Mr. Trump who stoke anger and fear in their
supporters provoke a surge of stress hormones /…/ and engage the amygdala /…/ This makes
it hard for people to dial down their emotions and think before they act.” While the study
Friedman refers to prefaces is finding with the statement that “direct evidence for [the
amygdala’s] role in the emotional processing of linguistic cues is lacking,” it does suggest
that the activity of the amygdala—a part of the brain responsible for releasing stress
hormones such as norepinephrine and cortisol—correlates with threatening language. While
correlation is not the same as causation, Friedman, to give him the benefit of the doubt, might
be hypothesizing causation because of his familiarity with a great number of studies
performed on animals that make a causal connection between stress and amygdala activation
very likely. However, Friedman at best oversimplifies and at worst misconstrues the
mechanisms related to decision-making when he suggests that politicians might have caused
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violence by triggering people’s amygdala with their fearmongering speech: “Mr. Trump has
managed to convince his supporters that /…/ we face an existential threat from imagined
dangers /…/ Where the men arrested in the synagogue shootings and bombing attacks
listening?”. Committing a violent act, especially a premeditated one like a shooting spree or a
bombing requires much more complex brain activity than simple amygdala firing. A person’s
amygdala fires up countless of times a day in response to as little as a light flashing suddenly,
or even just seeing color red. If stress hormones released by the amygdala were as powerful
and as overwhelming as Friedman suggests, it would be dangerous to even conduct studies in
which scientists evoke amygdala activity. Prefrontal cortex is the center of decision-making.
Any individual without a severe impairment of their prefrontal cortex makes decisions not
only according to physiological cues like levels of blood sugar and stress hormones but also
according to his beliefs and preconceptions. Suggesting that a politician may be partially
responsible for someone’s crimes because his speech triggered someone’s amygdala,
disregards the complexity of human cognition and unfairly relieves the culprits of the full
responsibility for their actions.
The last debatable proposition Friedman forwards is that hate speech leads to
dehumanization which leads to people treating the dehumanized group more poorly: “when
someone like President Trump dehumanizes his adversaries, he could be putting them beyond
the reach of empathy, stripping them of moral protection and making it easier to harm them.”
Yet again, however, Friedman puts forth a much stronger conclusion than the one suggested
by the Harris and Fiske study from 2011 that he links. Harris and Fiske establish firstly, that
when tasked with describing first a day in the life of a typical person and then of a homeless
person, the participants use comparatively fewer words that signal that they are imagining the
homeless person’s state of mind and secondly, that the participants’ anterior insula, a region
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of the brain implicated in disgust, interception, and pain and punishment neural network,
activates less when the participants view a picture of a member of a social group that they
rate highly in warmth. In suggesting that the study establishes that we are more eager to harm
the targets of dehumanizing speech, Friedman presents only one of the several possible
interpretations of the data. The results of Harris and Fiske’s first finding could be explained
by the fact that we have a harder time imagining the lives of people whose way of life
resembles ours less, whereas the second study merely establishes that human-perception
dimensions correlate with brain regions connected to disgust. Just as amygdala firing does not
guarantee violence, disgust neural networks activation is not exclusive to dehumanization, let
alone dehumanizing conduct. For lack of a less overused phrase, correlation does not equal
causation.
Contrary to Friedman’s suggestion, studies have found that dehumanization is not
exclusive to intergroup violence. Most notably, Simon and Gutsell in a 2021 study show that
dehumanization, defined as a failure to recognize cognitive and emotional complexities of the
people around us, occurs in completely everyday activities—as far as our brain activity is
concerned, we do not treat people as equally human in our everyday interactions.
Unsurprisingly, however, the fact that our brain has a hard time recognizing someone’s
cognitive and emotional complexity does not mean we have a sudden urge to harm them. Not
all dehumanization is malicious and leads to actions of violence. In their 2016 paper
Cameron, Harris, and Payne suggests that dehumanization at times occurs in order to reduce
emotional costs involved in helping stigmatized groups. In short, anyone with an
understanding of the scientific method and capable of reading and interpreting studies will
see that the connection between dehumanization, hate speech, and hate crimes is extremely
complex and context dependent. Friedman in his opinion piece justly calls for political
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leaders to think more about the effects their words may have on people and the way certain
kinds of language can feed pre-existing biases. It is fair to say that politicians affect public
opinion. However, it is not correct to assert that science shows that those spouting hate
speech are responsible for hateful actions or even hateful sentiments of people listening.
Responsibility requires causality that cannot be established by appealing to a few
correlations–especially not when we are dealing with a complex and messy web of factors
that contribute to the creation of group hatred. While Friedman’s call for greater civility is
well placed, it cannot claim the high ground of an empirical, scientific truth.
2. Dehumanization and Hate Speech
While Friedman poorly supports the idea that hate speech causes hate acts, many find
the connection intuitively appealing. Because people often turn to science to prove it, I will
discuss another attempt to integrate findings of neuroscience to extrapolate conclusions about
the expression and the enactment of hatred.
In a 2015 paper Gail and Richard Murrow attempt to explain what role
dehumanization has in hate acts. They propose that dehumanization “has an automatic
dampening effect on the neural mechanisms of pain empathy that enable empathy for the pain
and suffering of others” and propose that the neural mechanisms of pain empathy of someone
who dehumanizes a group of people by associating them with subhuman traits “do not
respond to the pain or suffering of that dehumanized category as robustly” which may explain
why they are more likely to hurt people they dehumanize (Murrow and Murrow, 337). They
see their theory as having potential implications for First Amendment jurisprudence as well
as for the dangers of permitting the expression of dehumanizing hate speech.
The first part of the Murrows’ hypothesis aims to causally connect dehumanization
with lack of empathy, but it relies on the (at best) questionable assumption that empathy is a
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conspecific phenomenon, namely that we empathize only with pain and emotion of another
human. The Marrow’s need this to be true because they are trying to establish that we lose
empathy for people because we consider them less than people. Such a claim goes against a
body of research that came to light since Premack’s seminal findings which showed that
children recognize complex properties and behaviors even when represented with geometrical
forms (Premack, 1990). Admittedly, in animal studies researchers often note greater or
exclusive responsiveness of subjects to the behavior conspecifics (Nieuwburg, 2021).
However, our ability to empathize with animals as well as our capacities for abstract
reasoning and emoting suggest that “our brains come pre-equipped with a broadly
generalized, and not at all conspecific, capacity for empathy” (Hoffman, 168). The Murrows’
suggestion that dehumanizing someone causes a decrease of empathy is thus ill supported. A
decrease of empathic response may cause dehumanization, or the two phenomena may be
only correlated.
The Murrows, however, continue to assume a causal connection between
dehumanization and lack of empathy and try to explain it through postulating implications of
research in ‘mirror neurons.’ Mirror neurons are most robustly studied in primates who have
been observed to experience an automatic mirror neural simulation when observing others
perform certain motor acts. While they were discovered in the context of motor research,
however, the idea of mirroring has been applied to the study of empathy for pain: “Though
much neuroscientific research has looked at pain empathy, the ground-breaking study was an
fMRI study conducted by Singer et al., in 2004, which provided early evidence that when one
individual observed a ‘sign’ that another individual was in pain, some of the same neural
components that are active in the firsthand experience of pain were also active in observing
or imagining another person in pain” (Murrow and Murrow, 346). However, as presented in
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The Student’s Guide to Social Neuroscience, the idea that emotion imitation equals empathy
“is an over-simplification” and “the link between mirror neurons themselves and imitation is
by no means uncontroversial” since “monkeys (who posses mirror neurons) have very limited
imitation ability” (Ward, 180). In other words, to the extent we currently understand mirror
neurons, a mirroring firing of neural pathways shows at best that you recognize an action or
an emotion; it by no means establishes that you will imitate it or are capable of doing so.
The Murrows have to rely on numerous dubious or even false assumptions in order to
put forth their dehumanization=lack of empathy=right-violating conduct hypothesis.
However, they go as far as to suggest that if accepted, their hypothesis bears implications to
hate speech as it “may shed a light not just on how hate speech might enable or incite
violence, but how it can do so in such an apparently unthinking, ‘banal’, perfunctory, rapid
manner” (Murrow and Murrow, 354). They believe that their theory explains how “hate
speech goes around the conscious mind to directly attack the emotional mechanisms of
empathy or moral restraint” (Murrow and Murrow, 355). However, they fail to provide
evidence for hate speech causing the dehumanization. It is ludicrous to suggest that anyone
who hears a hateful comment has suddenly had their conscious mind breached and their
emotional mechanisms for empathy impaired. The Murrows’ article explores how
dehumanization relates to empathy, but to show that hate speech causes dehumanization and
leads to hate crimes, they would need to conduct experiments to show that people’s emotional
mechanism of empathy towards a group falter after exposure to hate speech and their
proclivity to harm members of the group increases.
Mirror neuron theories and studies mapping brain activity, in the way they are
currently conducted, do not carry the answers to these questions. Even if we assume, without
clear evidence, that hate speech triggers neural networks related to hateful actions, it may do
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so because our brains recognize the content of the speech and not because we are inclined to
imitate it. Roginsky and Tsesis succinctly summarize the problematic way in which the
Murrows handle scientific evidence: “connecting the scientific concept of mirror neurons as a
potential explanation for individuals’ capacities to participate in discrimination, and worse, is
too much of an extrapolation. The original authors of the scientific papers on mirror neurons
described them as part of a motor function process, not a theory to help explain the darkest
times of history and human behavior” (Roginsky and Tsesis, 177). To their credit, the
Murrows acknowledge at several points that they are forwarding mere hypotheses and do not
deem their theory concrete enough to ground policy change. But to reach their conclusion
they need to stack suppositions and postulate causation where proof offers mere correlation to
the extent that renders their theory not only inapplicable to policy but also of very limited
scientific value. Societal hatred is an extremely complex social phenomenon. Neuroscience
can offer us insight into the mental processes that accompany hate. It can point at parts of the
brain that activate in response to certain stimuli. While it can tell us what happens in our
brain when we discuss or experience hatred, however, it is far from being able to help us
identify and prevent the causal process behind hate crimes.
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PART 3: WHAT MOTIVATES OVER-REGULATION OF FREE EXPRESSION?
A. The “Speech = Violence” Fallacy
There has undeniably been a shift in young people’s sentiments regarding
speech-regulation. Whereas liberal youth in the first half of the 20th century as well as in the
Vietnam War era used to be at the frontlines of the battle defending the freedom to express
controversial opinions such as anti-war, pacifist, and communist sentiments, young people
nowadays more frequently advocate for punishing or restricting speech they view as
offensive, triggering, or upsetting. The shift in young people’s attitudes towards free speech
may be explained by examining the shift in a key fundamental assumption at the background
of discussing speech regulation—whereas we once held speech to be the antidote to violence,
it is now more and more commonly perceived as violence itself. With the aid of French
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, I will examine the philosophical ideas that facilitated the
understanding of speech or language as violence. While I acknowledge that to an extent it is
possible in figurative terms to discuss language as violence, I will take a strong stance against
the proposition that speech be understood and treated literally as violence in the everyday
functioning of our society. After presenting and opposing the idea that speech equals violence
from a theoretical standpoint, I will examine a psychologist’s argument that aims to employ
findings from psychology to justify treating some speech as violence. A more careful
discussion of the science employed will reveal that equating speech with violence is neither
theoretically nor practically plausible.
1. Speech as the Opposite of Violence
In 1893, Sigmund Freud co-authored an academic paper in which he conveyed the
idea that “the man who first flung a word of abuse at his enemy instead of a spear was the
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founder of civilisation.”4 While this first catch-phrase is well known and frequently cited,
Freud continues his sentence by making a point about the relationship between words and
actions: “thus word is a substitute for deed and in some circumstances the only substitute.”5
Freud’s statements emphasize that the evolution of language enabled us to use speech instead
of action to communicate negative emotions. Such a shift from actions to words turned out to
be a ground-breaking invention that enabled the development of modern human
society—specifically because it promoted non-violent ways of resolving conflict. Anyone
even vaguely familiar with human history may rightfully doubt the idea that there has been
less violence amongst the human species since we have developed the capacity for speech.
Indeed, the development of speech enabled mankind to practice new and often even more
pernicious forms of violence such as wars, organized crime, genocide and so forth. However,
whereas in a world without speech the only way to express dissatisfaction or disagreement
with a fellow human was to act negative feelings out through violent outbursts, a world with
speech gives us a way to air our grievances in a non-violent way and develop laws and
contracts that disincentivize members of our modern societies to engage in violence. Violence
and speech ought therefore be understood as two possible ways to achieve an end. In a
society prioritizing civilized and constructive conflict-resolution speech rather than violence
is the go-to way of attaining goals. Violence replaces speech only when the situation calls for
more than “mere words” and requires a use of force.
In the philosophical tradition violence and speech are often presented in opposition to
each other. For example, Paul Ricoeur in “Violence and Language” argues that only once we
gained the capacity for speech, we began viewing violence as a negative tool to achieve one’s

4

“derjenige, welcher dem Feinde statt des Pfeiles ein Schimpfwort entgegenschleuderte, war der Begründer der
Civilisation” (Breuer und Freud, 1893)
5
“…so ist das Wort der Ersatz für die That und unter Umständen der einzige Ersatz” (Breuer und Freud, 1893)
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ends: “It is for a being who speaks, who in speaking pursues meaning, who has already
entered the discussion and who knows something about rationality that violence is or
becomes a problem” (33). Ricoeur thus presents violence and discourse as opposing concepts
that define each other through their contrast. Namely, just as language renders violence a
condemnable way of achieving goals, our linguistic capacities derive an aspect of their sense
from being non-violent: “Speech, discussion, and rationality also draw their unity of meaning
from the fact that they are an attempt to reduce violence” (33). He does not deny that speech
can be used to promulgate violence but presents pro-violent speech as an inherently
contradictory phenomenon: “a person cannot argue for violence without contradicting
himself, since by so arguing he wants to be right and already enters the field of speech and of
discussion, leaving his weapon at the door” (33). In other words, while speaking and arguing,
a pro-violent individual tries to achieve his goal not through violence but through discourse
thus undermining his own idea that violence rather than speech is the way to achieve his
goals. Ricoeur notes that Eric Weil in La Logique de la philosophie occupies a similar
position by presenting “coherent discourse and violence” as opposites (33). It is difficult to
imagine how two phenomena that through opposition define each other may be possibly
understood as one and the same.
2. Speech as Violence
And yet speech and violence stand in a more complicated relationship than that of a
clear opposition. In Ricoeur’s words, “violence speaks” (34). To examine the sense in which
speech is violence while despite being commonly construed as its opposite, Ricoeur walks us
through three different kinds of speech in which it is possible to equate violence to speech
itself: political, poetic, and philosophical.
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The kind of political speech Ricoeur views as a good example of violence is political
discourse conducted within a tyranny. According to Ricoeur “philosophy denounces tyranny
precisely because it invades philosophy’s territory: language” and “makes its way by
seduction, persuasion, and flattery” (35). To exemplify the proposition that this genre of
speech equals violence Ricoeur points out that in Nazi Germany, a sophist like Goebbels
needed to manufacture expressions “that mobilize hate, that consolidate the society of crime,
and that issue the summons to sacrifice and to death” (35). In other words, political
communication in tyranny is violence because it manufactures the conditions necessary for
violence to occur. Apart from tyranny, Ricoeur presents laws as a genre of violence because
they spring from an individuals’ decisions to give up their private violence to control
everyone through a great, looming, communal threat of violence: “the rule of law which gives
form to the social body is also power, an enormous violence which elbows its way through
our private violence” (36). One can indeed interpret legal communications and tyranny’s
propaganda as violence. But such an interpretation calls for an argument as to why we would
assume the stronger proposition, namely, that these two forms of speech are equal to
violence, rather than the more moderate one, namely, that these forms of speech perpetuate or
enable or bring about violence.
Similar to political speech, some aspects of poetic speech may be viewed as a form of
violence. To explain the rationale behind viewing poetry as violence, Ricoeur leans heavily
onto Heideggerian philosophy that understands meaning-creation as a process of drawing
Being into the open. Speech, as Ricoeur interprets Heidegger may be viewed “as the
submission to the prescriptions of a measure of Being to which man is originally open” (36)
which in simpler terms means that speech unravels the aspect of reality that has a potential to
be understood through the medium of the speaker. Such channeling of reality is non-violent
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in its core and yet is violence because of the Heideggerian perception of a nature of a word.
The word according to Heidegger “establishes a being in its Being and thus preserves it in its
openness” (37). If we metaphorically compare openness to a clearing in a dark forest from the
depths of which Being is dragged, a word forcefully pins down Being and preserves it in the
clear. Under such an interpretation of reality, the Heideggerian poet engages in violence
insofar as he enables the “poetic abduction” (37) of meaning: “The poet is the violent man
who forces things to speak” (37). Even though the complexity of Heideggerian philosophy
likely eludes a simple reduction of its propositions into analytical terms, such an elaborate
description of the purported violence of poetry begs many questions. For one, the
Heideggerian view seems perfectly consistent with the proposition that any meaning-creation
that brings Being into the open i.e. exposes some true or real aspect of our existence is a
violent act. Therefore, at least this simplified version of what may very well be a more
elaborate argument gives little reason for viewing merely poetic speech as well as merely
speech rather than other forms of meaning-creation as violence.
Apart from political and poetical language, Ricoeur presents philosophical discourse
as one fundamentally interwoven with violence. Firstly, he presents the specificity of an
initial question of a philosophic inquiry as a violent one: “To begin is always an exercise of
force, even and especially when one begins with absolute substance, as does Spinoza” (37).
In other words, the very process of beginning a philosophic inquiry—especially by setting a
course for the discussion with axioms as Spinoza does—may be perceived as a forceful and
hence, violent action. Secondly, Ricoeur presents the specificity of a course of thinking
inherent to doing philosophy as a violent phenomenon because it relies on assumptions or
presuppositions (37). Assumptions such as Spinoza’s axioms are necessary to begin a
philosophical conversation, but they do force the inquiry to take a certain direction in a way
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that Ricoeur calls violent. Lastly, philosophical language is burdened by “the violence of the
always premature conclusion” (38). Any course of philosophical thinking is necessarily
interrupted by practical matters. For example, publishers or journal editors want material of a
certain length while philosophers end their conversations because a class or meeting runs to
an end or an errand calls them away. Indeed, we can refer to philosophizing an act of violence
because of such traits constraining philosophical discourse. However, just like in the case of
poetic language, it is unclear that these traits are exclusive to philosophical conversation
rather than a trait of all communication which also often needs to be cut short, bases itself on
frequently arbitrary assumptions, and may begin somewhat forcefully.
All three of Ricoeur’s examples of speech that equals violence share a problem—they
propose to stretch the definition of violence so widely that almost nothing remains outside of
it. Leibsch in a contemporary article characterizes this trait of the attempts to reveal a deeper
relationship between speech and violence as follows: “the suspicion arises that violence
contaminates language as a whole, it soaks through everything that demands to be said, and it
threatens to affect all speaking, acting and thinking” (11). Tearing down the opposition
between discussion and violence that defines violence as problematic destroys the theoretical
foundation for rejecting violence and morally condemning it: “violence can no longer simply
be seen as a pathological exception, interruption or cancellation of an initially unaffected
normality. It rather appears to be normal to expect violence virtually anywhere” (11). It thus
appears that a key battle is fought in the field of defining language and violence: either we
permit violence’s definition to subsume all kinds of language and lose the ability to morally
condemn it, or we morally condemn it and restrict its definition in perhaps a slightly stricter
way than some people’s intuitions desire.
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Ricoeur recognizes this fundamental paradox of delineating between language and
violence and proposes that we “hold it to be a formal, though empty, truth, that discourse and
violence are the most fundamental opposites of human existence” (40). In other words, we
can technically use term violence to describe various aspects of expression from creating
meaning through denomination to rupturing a conversation. Nevertheless, we really should
not extend the definition lest we risk not being able or willing to morally condemn violence
since “he who has never ceased pointing violence out as the opposite of discourse will be
forever safeguarded against being its apologist, against disguising it, and against believing it
superseded when it has not been” (40). Rejecting the proposition that speech is violence thus
proves itself imperative to the rejection of violence and the protection of the most universal
moral maxim of them all—thou shalt not kill. As we shall see in the later discussion of the
current state of academia, the correlation between the rising rates of students who sympathize
with the idea that violence is a justifiable way to silence speech and the rising rates of
violence-tolerant viewpoints and violent protests on college campuses suggests that those
eager to equate speech with violence may very well be the ones most eager employ violence
to silence speech.
3. “Violent” Speech
Even though there might be a theoretical incentive to distinguish between speech and
violence, we encounter speech in our everyday life that seems as if it really could be called
violence because of the effect it has on us. Harassment, threats, and intimidation in particular
can put our bodies in a state of psychological stress with very real physical manifestations.
There are scientific discoveries regarding the connection between psychological and physical
ills that have been employed in the battle to define at least some kinds of speech as violence.
To examine the idea that we ought to reclassify some speech as violence out of respect for
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science, I will discuss an argument made by a distinguished professor of psychology from
Northeastern University Lisa Feldman Barrett in an opinion piece for The New York Times
and a critique of Feldman Barrett’s opinion as put forth by Pamela Paresky for Psychology
Today.
In “When Is Speech Violence?” Feldman Barrett argues that some forms of speech,
particularly “speech that bullies and torments” (Feldman Barrett), can from the perspective of
our bodily reactions to them be called forms of violence. She begins her argument by listing a
couple of scientific findings about the physiological effects of chronic stress: first, chronic
stress is one of the conditions under which our immune system’s own proinflammatory
proteins cytokines spike and may cause physical illness6 and second, chronic stress
accelerates the shortening of telomeres, the length of which is indicative of one’s longevity.7
According to Feldman Barrett, the connection between words and violence is fairly
straightforward: “If words can cause stress, and if prolonged stress can cause physical harm,
then it seems that speech /…/ can be a form of violence” (Feldman Barrett). Feldman Barrett
acknowledges the importance of not preventing beneficial short term-stress that certain
educational activities such as engaging with offensive arguments might evoke. Only chronic
stress warrants cancellation in her opinion, namely “the kind of stress that brings on illness
and remodels your brain” which she understands to be caused by exposure to “rampant
bullying” or to a “constant, causal brutality” (Feldman Barrett). Defining speech as a form of
violence would therefore be permissible only when said speech evokes sustained levels of
stress severe enough to cause physiological changes.

6

For an interesting meta-analysis of this relationship see Rohleder’s “Stress and inflammation—The need to
address the gap in the transition between acute and chronic stress effects” (2019).
7
For a meta-analysis of the complex relationship between the two see Jiang et al.’s “Basal cortisol, cortisol
reactivity, and telomere length: A systematic review and meta-analysis” (2019).
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Up to this point Feldman Barrett’s argument offers itself to little critique as it leans on
an idea strongly supported by science: that which causes chronic stress may cause in us the
same kinds of physiological changes that we associate with violence. However, Feldman
Barrett goes on to argue that said scientific reality makes it “reasonable, scientifically
speaking, not to allow a provocateur and hatemonger like Milo Yiannopoulos to speak at your
school” (Feldman Barrett). This policy proposal indeed seems to contradict her earlier
acknowledgement that short-term stress of educational activities can be beneficial and ought
not be prohibited. The contradiction is due to the fact that she does not view the presence of
speakers such as Yiannopolous as temporary, but rather presents him as “something noxious,
a campaign of abuse” and emphasizes that the discursive value of his speech is low— “debate
is not what he is offering” (Feldman Barrett). There is merit to Feldman Barret’s idea that
universities need not and perhaps should not waste their resources on speakers whose focus is
not to illuminate their listeners through intellectually rigorous discourse. However, Feldman
Barrett’s more ambitious conclusion, namely that speakers like Yiannopoulos ought not be
allowed on campuses because their speech is violence, seems highly contestable, least of all
because it does not follow from the science Feldman Barrett offers in its support.
In her Psychology Today piece, Paresky’s main objection to Feldman Barrett’s
interpretation of science is that it oversimplifies the process by which speech can cause
physical damage on us: “Feldman Barrett fails to consider several mediating factors in the
supposed causal chain between words and deleterious physiological effects.”. In particular,
Feldman Barrett fails to discuss the difference between stress and perceived stress and how
the latter is the only good indicator of what physiological effects an environmental factor will
have on us. When it comes to controversial speakers, Paresky thus emphasizes that the way
we perceive the speaker will have a much greater effect on our reaction to him than his actual
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offensiveness level: “If one person tells herself that listening to a speaker is going to be
intolerable and harmful, it stands to reason that the experience will be more stressful for her
than it will be for the person who tells herself it will be illuminating, or an opportunity to
defeat a bad idea.” The way we think about things influences their physiological impact on
us: if we believe particular stimuli or our lives in general are stressful, we will likely suffer
more negative impacts from being exposed to them.8
Because it is often our beliefs about our environments rather than our environments
themselves that hurt us, mindfulness training which focuses on addressing our perceptions of
stress rather than external stressors has been shown to have a beneficial effect on stress and
anxiety level as well as on sleep quality and general wellbeing.9 Thus, Paresky warns that not
only is it not true that some speakers enact violence upon their listeners, it is harmful to the
students to tell them so: “Students who believe that hearing certain words or listening to
certain speakers can harm them may, in fact, succumb to a self-fulfilling prophecy”
(Paresky). What any responsible educator on college campuses ought to do instead is to
encourage students to change their ways of perceiving the speakers whose ideas they find
disagreeable. Just like with mindfulness training, shifting interpretations of presences such as
Yiannopoulos may “counteract both the purportedly malignant ideas, and whatever harm
might otherwise result from potential stress of listening to them” (Paresky). According to
Paresky, speech may never be scientifically viewed as violence—it may lead to violence-like
effects but only if we choose to interpret it as such.

8

Perceived stress has been associated with an increased risk of events such as stroke (as an example of a
meta-analysis see Booth et al “Evidence of perceived psychosocial stress as a risk factor for stroke in adults: a
meta-analysis” (2015)). Displaying a similar pattern, perceived racism has been linked to more adverse mental
health (for a meta-analysis see Pieterse et al “Perceived racism and mental health among Black American adults:
A meta-analytic review” (2012)).
9
See Bartlett et al “A systematic review and meta-analysis of workplace mindfulness training randomized
controlled trials” (2019)
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Paresky is right to point out the importance of perceived stress and to object to
shunning speakers with controversial ideas from college campuses because of the harm their
words may cause. However, it might be too strong to claim that speech can never be
legitimately viewed and treated as at least equivalent to violence. In situations in which
verbal abuse is severe, targeted on an individual, and goes on for prolonged periods of time,
speech may indeed be considered as verbal violence—because it is violent. It brings about
physiological and psychological consequences that often manifests in bullying victims in
ways similar to the victims who suffer from physical attacks. Contrary to Feldman Barrett’s
implications, however, such violent speech has already been recognized as illegal and has
been prosecuted under harassment laws while its seemingly more innocent schoolyard
versions are tirelessly fought through anti-bullying incentives. What Paresky picks up upon in
her argument and what Feldman Barrett overlooks, is that those arguing that speech is
violence have long since lost interest in verbal harassment. Rather, they wish to cherry-pick
scientific evidence backing the harmfulness of verbal abuse and apply it more broadly so as
to get an excuse to censor expression and ideas for what appear to be political rather than
scientific purposes.
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PART 4: THE DANGERS OF ENDORSING “SPEECH=VIOLENCE” FALLACY
A. Trigger Warnings
1. The Idea
The notion that speech equals violence has taken many forms in the past decades. One
of its most successful yet controversial intellectual descendants is the idea that it is right and
perhaps even necessary for instructors to give trigger warnings before their students engage
with potentially upsetting material. Some claim that the term “trigger warning” applies to
certain common practices such as displaying the MPA rating of a movie before showing it.
However, unlike the MPA rating that is imagined as a tool for a viewer to decide whether or
not to watch movies with younger people around, trigger warnings in the classroom context
are declarations that context may be disturbing or upsetting intended to help students
mentally prepare for viewing the content or even avoid it if so desired. In their narrowest
scope, trigger warnings are aimed at a very small subset of the population: the victims of
trauma such as war veterans or rape survivors who suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and could potentially re-experience their trauma if exposed to “triggering”
content. However, since their humble beginnings, the mission of trigger warnings has
expanded to protect students without a PTSD-diagnosis from the negative feelings and stress
they may experience when reading about difficult topics such as sexual assault and racism.
In “Trigger Warnings: From Panic to Data” Francesca Laguardia eloquently
summarizes the two main assumptions motivating the adoption of trigger warning. First, there
is the assertion that students who have gone through trauma are in need of special protection
in order for them to have a fair chance of participation: “The added physiological effects of
traumatic triggering can only further imperil these students (or at least their grades), making
an already challenging situation impossible for as long as the response lasts” (888). Trigger
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warnings are believed to offer the necessary protection by mentally preparing the traumatized
students for the content to come and by giving them a chance to avoid it by not doing certain
readings or dropping the course. Second, trigger warnings are elevated by their advocates as
ways of raising awareness about and normalizing trauma: “These signals offer a lesson to
untraumatized students that such students exist, and that such people exist, and that these
responses to trauma exist” (890). In brief, the idea is that trigger warnings are a small
accommodation to make in order to make the classroom an inclusive and accepting space for
those whose experiences may otherwise undermine their learning.
2. The Data
While the intentions behind trigger warnings may be noble, the empirical studies
conducted in the past few years on the effects of trigger warnings have brought scientists to a
consensus that trigger warnings are not helpful to traumatized and untraumatized students and
likely have concerning side-effects for both groups. The most comprehensive data on the
effects of trigger warning comes from a Harvard study conducted by Bellet et al. in 2018 on
non-traumatised individuals with a pre-registered extension that later replicated its key
findings on people who have survived Criterion A trauma as defined by DSM-5. The most
charitable conclusion of the 2018 study was that trigger warnings have little effect other than
that for some people they cause a slight increase in negative emotions upon receiving the
warning: “Trigger warnings do not appear to affect sensitivity to distressing material in
general, but may increase immediate anxiety response for a subset of individuals whose
beliefs predispose them to such a response” (Bellet et al., 140). The more concerning finding,
however, indicates that “trigger warnings may present nuanced threats to selective domains of
psychological resilience,” namely they may decrease people’s confidence in their own mental
resilience and facilitate a “disability-related stigma around trauma survivors” (Bellet et al.,
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140). While the latter result did not replicate on the 2020 study conducted on trauma
survivors (i.e., participants presented with trigger warnings did not proceed to rate other
trauma survivors as less mentally resilient than the participants in the control group), the
2020 study confirmed that there is no evidence that trigger warnings are helpful as well as
unveiled substantial evidence that trigger warnings reinforce the trauma survivors’ view of
their trauma as central to their identity (Jones et al., 905). Furthermore, they discovered that
those with more severe PTSD symptoms experienced an increase in anxiety after being
trigger-warned, remarking that “trigger warnings may be most harmful for the individuals
they were designed to protect” (Jones et al., 915). These findings as well as a meta-analysis
of other studies led the authors to assess the use of trigger warnings as “irresponsible to
victims of trauma” and to caution against it (Jones et al., 915).
Apart from the Harvard scientists’ definitive debunking of the supposed benefits to
trigger warnings, there have been studies conducted more specifically on students and on
more ambiguous rather than explicit content. Such empirics are relevant to consider because
college professors have in the past years tended to adorn more and more mild material with
trigger warnings guided by the “better safe than sorry” principle. However, trigger warnings
are not a harmless measure as shown by a 2021 study confirming the “nocebo hypothesis,”
namely the idea that trigger warnings lead students to “interpret the upcoming material as
more consequential than they would appraise it sans warning” (Bruce et al.). The study
measured students’ physiological responses to receiving a disclaimer before a relatively mild
clip from a Harry Potter movie. When the disclaimer included the phrase “trigger warning,”
the students tended to display significantly greater physiological symptoms of stress than in
the control group leading the researchers to conclude that since “trigger warnings are found to
have negligible benefits in addition to anxiogenic effects, there is a reluctance to recommend
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their use” (Bruce et al.). A 2019 meta-analysis of 5 experiments in which 1600 participants
were exposed to ambiguous stimuli discovers a similarly concerning implication for the
salience of employing trigger warnings in the classroom setting. Trigger warnings increased
the participants’ negative mood, anxiety levels, and negative expectations before they viewed
the image and led some to drop out of the study but had “few subsequent benefits” (Bruce et
al.). With the data about the lack of beneficial effects and the potential harms of trigger
warnings piling up, there is little doubt that instructors ought not implement them in their
teaching.
3. The Stakes
Even though the empirical data gives little reason to adopt trigger warnings in the
classroom, the fact remains that instructors cannot make the decision solely on the basis of
empirics. Students often themselves demand trigger warnings or even the elimination of
certain materials. This leaves instructors unsure whether to yield to the students’ wishes
despite knowing that issuing trigger warnings and permitting avoidance-behaviors is not
necessarily benefiting their students. Too often, if they wish to uphold the teaching style that
they believe best facilitates a meaningful engagement with course topics, there looms a threat
that they will face their student’s displeasure that has the potential to negatively affect their
careers. A 2017 testimony of an associate professor of Rhetoric at Berkeley Ramona Naddaff
“The Wrong Words in the Wrong Times” offers good insight into the practical consequences
that enabling the sensitivities of students has on the atmosphere in the classrooms. It shows
what exactly is at stake for academia if it chooses to disregard the empirics behind trigger
warnings and blindly endorse them for their imaginary symbolic value of signaling that we
care and support trauma survivors.
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Ramona Naddaff has found herself under criticism of a student whom we will refer to
as Tony (pseudonym). In an online reflection written in response to one of the first lectures in
her course, Tony expressed the belief that Naddaff’s “‘condoned’ sexual violence and
‘reinforced patriarchal structures to further oppress non-men-identifying individuals,
including women.” Furthermore, Tony felt his instructor “invalidates, trivializes, and
marginalizes the lived experience of sexual violence survivors” (96). What Tony responded
to so strongly, however, is according to Naddaff’s testimony, a mere usage of a metaphor
common in scholarly discussions of rhetoric, not even central to Naddaff’s lecture:
“In passing, I explain the ancient connection between rhetoric and violence, some
Greeks associating rhetoric with a violent force that overcomes its listeners’ resistance to
persuasion. I mention that sometimes rhetoric is metaphorically compared even to rape, a
trope of special importance in Gorgias’s Encomium to Helen. I then show an image of the
goddess Peitho (Persuasion), next to which I write “rhetoric as rape,” thinking that this
formulation, which I have taken from an article, will entice students to consider what it
means to compare rhetoric with violence” (93).
Tony’s reaction, furthermore, was an outlier rather than a commonly shared take on
the professor’s lecture. According to another student’s testimony, Naddaff’s style of teaching
was nothing to get upset about: “this was not an act of sexual violence, not a depiction of
sexual violence, not pornography, not a story about rape, not even remotely a sexual
discussion, but a casual mention of a metaphor, albeit a gritty one, that was relevant to the
course” (93). Nevertheless, Tony’s accusations achieved a significant shift in the class
atmosphere. They prompted the instructors to meet with him individually as well as to
conduct an open classroom discussion about the professor’s use of language in which some
students expressed that “they want trigger alerts” (98). In contrast, other students defended
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open discussion through comments such as “I don’t think that we should dismiss generations
of scholarship just because there are words we find troubling and uncomfortable. Part of our
education here is to be made uncomfortable in our own thoughts and experiences and to learn
to develop critical thinking around controversial issues” (98). Nevertheless, the professor’s
experience of teaching the class shifts as she reflects: “It takes the class a few weeks to settle
down. I can never imagine speaking freely again” (99). Some may view Naddaff’s shift of
attitude as too dramatic, but instructors, especially those without the safety of a tenure
position, have very valid reasons for being afraid of offending a Tony in their classrooms.
The trigger warning debate is merely a small subset of the larger issue of the growing
tendency of US universities to put the comforts of their students above their intellectual
development. As Naddaff’s teaching assistant Katharine hints at, a single student like Tony
has the capacity to alter the course of his instructors’ careers regardless of whether or not
Tony’s response is proportionate to “the crime” committed: “in an academic context in which
the “right” not to be emotionally or intellectually “injured” in any way was much discussed
and perhaps excessively protected, Tony had actual power” (95). The dilemma that Katharine
and Naddaff are navigating is one in which many liberal professors find themselves in. On
the one hand, Katharine as a self-proclaimed feminist comprehends “the feeling of
self-empowerment that comes with the assertion of personal rights” and “mobilizing for a
cause” (99). However, she also worries about “the dangers, in this kind of rights-based
thinking, of solipsism and myopia, and worse—a sense of entitlement that has led not to any
democratic resolution of the original problem but instead to an identity politics that has
become self-centered and personal” (99). She concludes her testimony with a powerful
metaphor that captures the dangers of allowing and perhaps even encouraging young people
to place one person’s personal emotional comfort on a pedestal and pursue it even when it
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negatively affects the educational experience of their peers: “young people are holding their
self-protective trigger warnings up like crosses to ward off the devil. To do so risks taking the
self too seriously, and the social not seriously enough” (99). Stories like this suggest that
classrooms cannot commit to being a “safe space” in the sense that teaching will never evoke
strong negative emotions in any one student if classrooms are to remain a “safe space” for
discussion, argument, and a daring scholarly exploration of ideas.
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B. Campus Climate
1. The Problem of Safetyism
Psychologists and civil rights activists alike have suggested that the rise of popularity
of trigger warnings is a mere facet of a larger issue plaguing US academia. Most notably
Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff published an article in the Atlantic in 2015 that due to
interest it received became a book-length project. The Coddling of the American Mind: How
Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure explores the idea
that phenomena such as trigger warnings, safe spaces, strict campus speech codes, and
protesting controversial speakers are on the rise because administrators, educators, as well as
students themselves have accepted the proposition that students are mentally fragile and need
to be protected not merely from physical but also from emotional distress. Haidt and
Lukianoff do not deny that there are real issues such as social inequalities and mental health
challenges that students face, issues towards which universities can and should direct
resources and attention. However, they worry about what consequences the approach taken
by the universities to protect their students has on the mental resilience of the students as well
as the future of academia. They emphasize that in psychology it is broadly accepted that
“what people choose to do in their heads will determine how those real problems affect them”
(14) and suggest universities err when they ignore these psychological findings and cater to
the students’ every demand thus placing their student’s comforts over their personal and
intellectual growth.
2. The Empirics of Safetyism
Since the publication of The Coddling of the American Mind, researchers have begun
to empirically study Haidt and Lukianoff’s theories. Besides the research that supports their
concern about implementing trigger warnings which I presented in the section before, a
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recent study from University of California, Irvine establishes the relationship between
multiple variables as predicted by Haidt and Lukianoff: “we found that students’ self-reported
prevalence of cognitive distortions positively predicted their endorsement of
safetyism-inspired beliefs, the belief that words can harm, and support for the broad use of
trigger warnings” (Celniker et al, 1). This large (N-786), economically and ethnically diverse
study finds that the extent to which you engage in cognitive distortion significantly predicts
whether you believe that words can harm and whether you support trigger warnings. This
leads the authors to suggest that overextending the definition of violence, prejudice, and
trauma “may inadvertently engender ‘looping effects’ whereby students come to interpret
actions that they would have otherwise deemed minimally harmful as more aversive”
(Celniker et al, 5). Furthermore, the study discovers a negative association between
safetyism-inspired beliefs and both resiliency and analytic thinking which the authors find
particularly relevant to the dilemmas faced by higher institutions: “if university stakeholders
aspire to develop campus cultures and evidence-based policies that better prepare students for
the conflict-ridden world they inhabit, then they must be more willing to scrutinize the
psychological antecedents of safetyism-inspired beliefs and the consequences of
safetyism-inspired practice” (Celniker et al, 5). While more empirical research is needed,
especially to establish firm causality, this study gives good reasons to be worried about the
pernicious effects of glorifying safety and fostering a culture of oversensitivity.
3. The Pursuit of “Safety” On College Campuses
The idea that speech is violence lies at the very core of the problem US campuses face
today. The changes in the way universities approach their students discussed by Haidt and
Lukianoff find their ideological roots in accepting intellectual descendants of the proposition
that speech is violence such as the idea that you “dehumanize” students by wrongly assuming
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their nationality or gender, that you “invalidate” students’ identity if you question their
experience-based conclusions on social issues, and that you can “harm” students by
expressing disagreement with their core beliefs. Once we begin viewing the consequences of
distressing and offensive speech as a legitimate threat to students’ safety, speech codes aimed
at preventing “violent speech” become as important as campus security teams that protect
students from physical violence. By discussing some most controversial case-studies of the
past years, I hope to show that university communities have accepted the idea that free
discussion lies in the way of ensuring a “safe environment” for the students and examine the
implications of the shift for the quality of higher education across the US.
Despite the popularity of mockingly portraying liberal students as “snowflakes”—the
implication being they are fragile and melt easily—the issue of canceling speech for its
purported harmful effects is a non-partisan one. When it comes to attempts at speaker
disinvitations, left-leaning crowds have been the predominant source of calls for
speech-suppression in the last decade, especially in the tense beginnings of the Trump
presidency (see table 1). Nevertheless, the right has quite significantly caught up in the years
since and is not trailing far behind (see table 1). As far as critiquing scholars and professors is
concerned, the left likewise clearly dominates in the last two years but has been closely
followed and even overtook in 2017 by the calls for speech suppression from the right (see
table 2). Speaker-disinvitations and scholar controversies started by the right tend to more
often be related to a conservative tendency to revere things like marriage, presidency, and
pre-natal life and seems to be motivated by a wish to instill similar values onto others or at
least not morally corrupt them through exposure to contrary views. Because my main focus is
discussing censorship stemming from the idea that some speech is violence and endangers
students, I will mostly be bringing up cases where criticism comes from the left. Rest assured
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however, that speech censorship from the right exists, is concerning, and ought to be equally
decisively rejected.

Table 1: Cases of speaker disinvitation incentives on US campuses overtime from the political right and left
(data sourced from FIRE’s Disinvitation Database)

Table 2: Cases of professors and scholars caught into expression-related controversies on US campuses overtime
(data sourced from FIRE’s Scholars Under Fire Database)
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I. “Dangerous” Ideas
Students, educators, and administrators alike have at some point in the past decade
made a small and yet monumental shift in discussing racist, transphobic, xenophobic, and
other kinds of undesirable ideas. What were once considered ideas that aim to dehumanize
certain people, aim to invalidate their identities, and aim to harm the students’ feelings, are
now discussed as ideas that do dehumanize individuals, invalidate their identities, and harm
them. Shifting our language ever so slightly fundamentally changes the metaphysical status
of humanity and dignity by attributing way too much power to such speech and the morally
condemnable individuals spreading it. One’s humanity, identity, and personal well-being are
things that are constructed and maintained by one’s day to day interactions and can by no
means be taken away by a couple of demeaning comments from strangers. For example, a
group of young men may aim to objectify and hurt me by discussing my appearance
disrespectfully and shouting sexist remarks and abuses my way, but as long as I am treated
respectfully by my loved ones on a day-to-day basis, their words will not make me any less of
a human being, nor will they make a significant impact on my emotional well-being
(assuming I am able to leave their presence when I want to). Members of the university
communities, however, have accepted words as much more powerful than they actually are,
rendering students, educators, and administrators alike much more likely to react strongly and
defensively in face of ideas they view as objectionable.
The most notorious example of what happens when a community embraces the view
that words and ideas have power to inflict serious evils onto their members are the violent
protests urging for a disinvitation of Milo Yiannopoulos—a famous conservative provocateur
and Trump supporter—that happened at Berkeley in 2017. The goal of the protests was to
prevent Yiannopoulos’s speech from happening and to achieve said goal protesters resorted to
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vandalism and violence of extraordinary degrees. The property damage alone amounted to
$100,000 on campus and $400,000 to $500,000 off campus (Kutner). However, more
concerning even was the violence: multiple people got beaten up, a student journalist trying
to record the event got chased off withs sticks and punches (Jandhyala), and a woman was
pepper sprayed while giving an interview to a news team (Egelko). The event was indeed
canceled, and the aggressive crowd faced little to no consequence for their actions. The police
only arrested a single person that night (for failure to disperse) and UC Berkeley refrained
from openly disciplining its students. While it is impossible to know how many of the
protesters were Antifa activists rather than members of the UC Berkeley’s community, some
students did come forward and admitted to participating violently yet they faced no
consequences.
Most concerning, however, was the way the student body reflected on the protests
through UC Berkeley’s student led newspaper The Daily Californian. A series of five op-eds
were published soon after the incidents under the theme “Violence as Self-Defense” with the
opinion pieces titled “Violence helped ensure safety of students,” “Condemning protesters
same as condoning hate speech,” and “Black bloc did what the campus should have.” The
authors of the opinion pieces clearly implicitly or explicitly subscribe to the view that some
speech is violence and as a consequence apologize, justify, and downright embrace violence
as a valid way of boycotting the Yiannopoulos event. One author proclaims that “Antifa was
there to protect UC Berkeley students when the administration was not” (Lawrence) while the
other joins in expressing gratitude for the presence of the violent protestors, saying “I’m here
to thank the radical measures the AntiFas took to ensure my safety” (Prieto). Behind both of
those statements lies a belief that certain kinds of speech because of its content presents a
threat to safety that university has a duty to eliminate. If the university fails, the students are
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right to take up any means necessary to ensure their own safety. Standing in their way would
be equivalent to stifling the students’ right to self-defense, as the third op-ed author informs
us: “asking people to maintain peaceful dialogue with those who legitimately do not think
their lives matter is a violent act” (Dang). The assertion that violence would have been done
onto the students if the event was permitted to go on is highly speculative and overblown and
yet seems to be unquestioningly accepted by these students. As the fourth opinion writer
dramatically asserts, to critique violent protests means to disregard serious damage done unto
students by a speaker like Yiannopoulos and shows that “you care more about broken
windows than broken bodies” (Meagley). The assumption of danger behind permitting the
expression of the speaker’s view plays a strong role in their arguments, yet its truth goes
uninterrogated.
Berkeley’s 2017 protests are perhaps the most extreme example of where we may end
up if we commit to viewing controversial speech as violent and harmful. The tensions of the
time were certainly exacerbated by the general political atmosphere—only a few weeks
before, for example, Trump began his presidency. However, the hesitancy of the university to
penalize those causing mayhem as well as the students’ endorsement of violence as a valid
response to unwelcome ideas are in no way unique or even unusual phenomena on US
college campuses. In 2017, a survey by Brookings Institution found that 19% of students
agreed that using violence to prevent a speaker from speaking is acceptable (Villasenor). The
same year, McLaughlin and Associates found that 30% of students polled believe that
violence can be used to stop people from “using hate speech or engaging in racially charged
comments” (French). In 2021 a survey done by FIRE and College Pulse corroborated such
results by finding that 23% of students from over 150 universities find it rarely (17%),
sometimes (5%), and always (1%) acceptable to use violence to stop a campus speech
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(College Pulse). Any percentage above 0% should concern us, but to see up to 30% express
sympathy with such a radical proposition is staggering.
Unfortunately, administrators have more often than not found it easier to cater to the
demands of their “customers” and to endorse the idea that speech harms, despite its
implications for the normalization of violence. A good example of how commonplace and
ordinary such attitudes towards expression are comes from Colorado State University’s
campus in early 2022. CSU as a public university has an obligation to uphold student’s First
Amendment rights, yet its administration found an inventive way to express allegiance with
the ideas that speech harms by putting up a sign directing students towards resources at their
disposal to cope with free speech: “If you (or someone you know) are affected by a free
speech event on campus, here are some resources…” (Soave). A message communicated to
the students through such a poster is remarkably similar to that of trigger warnings: you (and
those around you) are fragile and need protection from ideas. Such messaging, while
well-meaning, is counterproductive to encouraging mental resilience in students as it has the
potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy much like trigger warnings. UC Berkeley’s
opinion piece writers and CSU’s administration assume as a given a highly contestable and
politicized interpretation of reality by presenting speech as a hindrance to students’ safety and
well-being. While the two examples differ in degree, they are of the same kind as they are
motivated by the same ideology that presents ideas as literally rather than merely figuratively
dangerous.
II. Glorified “Safety”
The implicitly and sometimes explicitly endorsed notion that ideas endanger the
safety of students has led universities to foster a culture of hypersensitivity. Haidt and
Lukianoff mark what is going on with the term safetyism—the cult of safety—or an
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“obsession with eliminating threats (both real and imagined) to the point at which people
become unwilling to make reasonable trade-offs demanded by other practical and moral
concerns” (32). When it comes to the treatment of speech on college campuses, university
communities have indeed become so passionate about creating “safe environments” for their
students that they are willing to take extreme actions against any expression perceived by
students as harmful without considering relevant factors for rational evaluation of an
appropriate response such as the intent of the speaker. Rules of common etiquette that dictate
one to interpreting the opponent’s views charitably and resolving conflicts respectfully have
been frequently discarded as has been a sense of proportionality in the sanctions faced by
those whose speech upsets.
One of the biggest controversies that exemplifies oversensitivity is the response
ensued from the Yale community after Erika Christakis, a lecturer in developmental
psychology and a president of a small residential college, sent an email expressing concern
about the significance of Yale’s administration warning students not to dress up in insensitive
costumes for Halloween in an official email. Christakis’s email is a thoughtful exploration of
what she admits is a difficult topic to navigate, prompted by “a number of students frustrated
by the mass email” (Christakis) who reached out to her and her husband co-presiding the
college. She states clearly that her concerns stem from her insights as a developmental
psychologist who wishes to allow young adults to exercise their own strength and judgment
and not from a “wish to trivialize genuine concerns” (Christakis). Despite her civility and her
clearly good intentions, the reaction of a faction of students to her email is markedly
negative. Students demanded that the couple be removed from their residential positions and
proceeded to attack them “with hateful insults, shouted epithets, and a campaign of public
shaming” (Friedersdorf). In an open letter to Christakis, the students took the most
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uncharitable if not downright incorrect interpretations of her email claiming it “trivializes the
harm done by these tropes [insensitive Halloween attire] and infantilizes the student body to
which the request was made” (Friedersdorf) even though Christakis explicitly takes a stance
specifically against trivializing and infantilizing. Yale’s president responded to the uproar by
“acknowledging students’ pain and committing to ‘take actions that will make us better’”
(Haidt and Lukianoff, 56). He did not at all discuss whether the students’ responses were
proportionate to the offense or more fundamentally whether insults and shouting matches are
an appropriate way of conflict-resolution. The university did not express any support for the
Christakises until weeks after the event. Eventually, the couple resigned from their positions
in the college and Erika from her teaching position as well (Shick). Even if the critique
towards administrative paternalism that Christakises voiced was ill-placed, the backlash
against them was overblown, uncivil, and disproportionate to their perceived offense.
Many similarly overblown controversies have occurred since 2015 in which students,
backed by the administration and faculty, respond disproportionately and unforgivingly to
their educators’ mistakes. Most often students choose to interpret statements of context, see
no value in considering the speaker’s intent, and see harsh backlash as not only justifiable but
a duty of morally vigilant communities. When in 2020 Rose Salseda, an assistant professor in
art history at Stanford, played a clip from the N.W.A song “Fuck the Police” and read some
lyrics containing the n-word from her slides, neither the circumstance of her utterance nor her
positionality mattered. Despite being a Latinx professor lecturing in a Comparative Studies in
Race and Ethnicity who made an arguably ill-considered decision to present a song in the
way its authors wrote it, the students were unforgiving. Even though Salseda apologized after
being confronted with the students’ upset, the Undergraduate Senate harshly condemned her
for her “continuous aggressions against the black community” and demanded that all the
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professors teaching the course take “cultural humility training” (Thuman). In 2021 students
and professors from U Michigan were similarly unforgiving towards professor Bright Sheng
and like in Salseda’s case considered his attempt to apologize as an even greater reason to
reprimand him. Prof. Sheng, an Asian-American, was according to his biography on U
Michigan’s website a teenager during Chinese Cultural Revolution who narrowly avoided
being sent to a re-education farm by auditioning for a music ensemble. The offense that led
to him stepping down as a professor was showing a 1965 version of Othello which is
notoriously controversial because the main character is played by Lawrence Olivier in
blackface. Mimicking the rhetoric devices of their students, the composition department’s
professors condemned Sheng’s actions as “disappointing and harmful to individual students
in many different ways, and destructive to our community” (Schuessler). Salseda’s and
Sheng’s actions may indeed be seen as inconsiderate to some students, but to depict them as
acts of aggression deserving of institutional sanctioning feeds into the ill-conceived idea that
ensuring a “safe learning environment” requires an extreme level of sensitivity to any kind of
offense or emotional distress.
Perhaps the most representative example of the culture of hypersensitivity fostered by
nearly a decade of overblown responses, however, is the firing of an adjunct professor at
Fordham in 2021. Christopher Trogan was fired after mixing up the names of two black
students in class. He attributed his mistake to his “confused brain” as they were arriving to
class late and he claimed to have made attempts to apologize to them: “I have done my best
to validate and reassure the offended student that I made a simple, human, error. It has
nothing to do with race” (Skelding and Byrne). The plot thickens, however, because it was
not merely the students who overreacted, Trogan did too. He wrote a curious email to the
students in his class afterwards in which he apologized, stressed “everything he has done for
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minorities” as well as encouraged upset students to complain to the administration:
“Depending on your response to the officials above, I may—or may not—be your professor
in class next week. It’s all up to you” (Skelding and Byrne). Given the lack of transparency of
the situation it is difficult to identify the greatest victims of the situation—Trogen did get
fired, but perhaps his own overreaction contributed to it more than reports can tell. The fact
that an innocent name mix-up can start a causal chain that costs an academic his job,
however, shows how unforgiving, ruthless, and hostile universities have become in
responding to honest mistakes. The culture behind these cases developed overtime as a result
of administrators and faculty passively allowing or even actively encouraging a type of
conflict-resolution that views its ends of pursuing equality and inclusion as important enough
to justify even the most uncivil and unjust means.
III. The True Dangers of Academia
Paradoxically, attempts of universities across the US to facilitate a “safe” learning
environment for their students by censoring expression has made universities a dangerous
space for intellectual activity of students and professors alike. Too many incidents have
occurred over the past decade in which not only careers, but the physical well-being of
professors, scholars, and students have come under threat because they expressed
controversial ideas or opinions or merely failed to participate in cancel culture.
Activities necessary for the functioning of higher education can put one in serious
danger in the current academic environment. In 2017, for example, a violent crowd of
students gave Allison Stanger, a professor at Middlebury college, a concussion because
she—a self-proclaimed Democrat—was trying to moderate a discussion with Charles Murray
who was a scholar at American Enterprise Institute at the time (Stanger). Her intention was to
engage Dr. Murray in an intellectual discussion, but because she did not reject Dr. Murray
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and his ideas without consideration, she was perceived guilty by association. Kathleen Stock,
a philosophy professor at University of Sussex, faced similarly ungrounded threats of
violence which in 2021 led her to resign from her position. Like Stanger, Stock herself as a
feminist and a researcher into the topics of sexual orientation, gender self-identification, and
sexual objectification does not belong to the ideological right. Yet because her research into
gender identities was branded by some as transphobic, groups of students were adamant to
see her fired at all costs, employing protest, shaming, and intimidation techniques that led her
to mark her experience as “medieval” (Adams). More ridiculous still is the suspension that
Gordon Klein, a UCLA professor, faced in 2021 because he refused a request to grade
students of color differently to other students (Shoaib). If moderating a discussion,
researching gender, and maintaining objective grading standards can get you anything from a
suspension to a concussion and death threats, universities are not doing enough to ensure a
safe working environment for their employees.
Students are in no better position than their educators. Three recent examples
demonstrate just how far safetyism stretches. First, there is Austin Tong from Fordham
university whose two Instagram posts in 2020 led to him facing disciplinary action because of
a purported “bias and/or hate crime and threatening or intimidating behavior” (Patridge-Hicks
and Russo). In his first post, Austin shared a photo of a police captain who died while
responding to a looting with a caption “Y’all a bunch of hypocrites” while his second offense
was sharing a photo of himself holding a gun which he legally owns to commemorate the
Tiananmen Square Massacre (Patridge-Hicks and Russo). Regardless of how one evaluates
Tong’s way of communicating his ideas, it is concerning that universities view their student’s
activity on their private social media accounts as subject to the university’s speech guidelines.
The second example comes from University of Virginia’s School of Medicine which
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sanctioned a student Kiaran Battacharya for raising a question at the panel discussion on the
subject of microaggressions and consequently “branded him a threat to the university and
banned him from campus” (Soave). The question that prompted the chain of events leading to
Battacharya’s suspension was a clarificatory question on whether one must be a member of a
marginalized groups to be a victim of a microaggression. Similar to his case, Adrianna San
Marco from Syracuse University faced disproportionately grave consequences because she
critically engaged with a controversial topic. San Marco was fired from her columnist
position at a student newspaper The Daily Orange because she wrote an opinion piece
dismissing the notion of “institutional racism” for an unrelated website (Flood). She received
threats and harassment from her fellow students as well as physical threats promising
violence upon her return to campus and has had peers and professors celebrate her firing as
well as call for her expulsion (Flood). The overwhelming message of such examples is one of
warning for students to tread lightly because a social media post, a pointed question, or a
critical opinion piece can put them in danger. The effects cannot but be chilling.
The examples I have so far outlined may lead one to believe that students, faculty, and
administrators on the ideological left are always the ones to appeal to safety and call for
censorship on the basis of intellectually flawed (or at least highly questionable) assumptions
such as that expressing some ideas is an aggression and an act of violence. While the
ideology of speech = violence has strong roots in postmodernist conceptions about language
that made its greater impression on the political left, I want to push back against
characterizing this as a simple partisan issue. It has become more and more frequent for those
on the political right to present censorship of expression as a means of protecting students
from dangerous ideas, though there are often other values than merely safety at play.
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For example, in 2017, Essex County College first suspended and then fired its
professor Lisa Durden for her appearance on Fox News in which she defended the right of
groups such as BLM to organize black-only events (Schmidt). The college justified its
decision by emphasizing that they reject “any conduct that implies that all students are not
welcome to participate in, or benefit from, our programs or activities on the basis of their
race, color, orientation, or national origin” (Schmidt). While Durden’s opinions and the way
she expressed them lend themselves to much critique, the implication that her conduct was a
threat to students because it suggested they do not have a right to equal educational
opportunities is a rather farfetched, certainly uncharitable, and a relatively catastrophized
interpretation of her speech. Other teachings of Critical Race Theory (CRT) similar to
Durden’s thoughts on self-segregation have in the past five years increasingly frequently
faced similar critiques of being too harmful to deserve a platform. Most passionate uproar
regarding CRT arose from controversial ways in which ideas of race and privilege have been
passed onto minors and rightfully so—governments have an obligation to ensure certain
protections to underage persons, including by determining what does and does not belong on
a public school’s curriculum. Lately, however, it has been suggested that teaching CRT ought
to be banned from higher education as well. Most notably, lt. gov. of Texas recently proposed
to remove tenure in publicly funded higher education facilities to enable sanctions to those
who teach CRT (NBCDFW). Patrick justifies his decision in a Tweet by saying that
professors “poison the minds of young students” with CRT, thus exemplifying that those with
right-wing or conservative views are not immune to attributing expression too much power
and adopting protectionist and censorial attitudes towards expression when convenient.
Playing into the misconception that some or other kinds of expression can enact
violence, harm, and poison minds has a non-partisan allure as it carries with it a ready-made
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conclusion that it is permissible and desirable to censor it. Allowing adults—especially young
ones—to be exposed to all kinds of ideas and take responsibility for the beliefs they adopt is
much more difficult because it requires us to trust people’s ability to intellectually
self-govern. As foolish and optimistic as such trust may appear at the surface level, however,
higher education cannot fulfill its role without it.
4. A Beacon of Hope: University of Chicago Principles
In response to a series of incidents at which students called for disinvitations of
controversial speakers, University of Chicago formed a Committee on Freedom of
Expression in 2014 that formulated and published a statement intended to offer robust
protection of freedom of expression at the university and to acknowledge the centrality of the
commitments to free expression for the goals of the university. As of December 2021, FIRE
reports on 83 institutions that have joined in endorsing the Chicago Statement (FIRE).
Besides voicing the university’s commitment to debate, the statement puts emphasis on the
duty of universities to create an environment prioritizing intellectual pursuits over comfort:
“education should not be intended to make people comfortable, it is meant to make them
think. Universities should be expected to provide the conditions within which hard thought,
and therefore strong disagreement, independent judgment, and the questioning of stubborn
assumptions, can flourish in an environment of the greatest freedom” (University of Chicago,
1). There are many competing ideas about the purpose of higher education. Some insist that
the central goal of universities ought to be the pursuit of truth while others discuss the telos as
sparking curiosity or fostering critical inquiry. All of those values, however, are centered
around learning that is necessarily infringed on if members of university communities
demand that certain ideas and topics, however controversial, be excluded from the spectrum
of permissible.
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The Chicago Principles oppose content-based regulation that ends discussion: “debate
or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or
even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or
wrong-headed” (University of Chicago, 2). Moreover, they showcase precisely the kind of
faith in the ability of people to intellectually self-govern that those looking to stifle speech for
protectionist purposes deny: “It is for the individual members of the University community,
not for the University as an institution, to make those judgments for themselves, and to act on
those judgments not by seeking to suppress speech, but by openly and vigorously contesting
the ideas that they oppose” (University of Chicago, 2). As such the Chicago Statement offers
a good example of the attitude universities should adopt when addressing speech incidents in
order to foster a flourishing intellectual environment where students are treated as capable
and responsible thinkers rather than as emotionally fragile victims.
The foresight of adopting such a statement in 2014 is admirable, but there are areas in
which the Chicago Statement could say more. While it takes a general stance against
content-based suppression of ideas, it does not say anything specific about its commitments
to support their faculty in cases when non-malicious word-choices or teaching techniques
spur an uproar amongst the students. The numerous incidents such as I outline in earlier
sections often make professors, especially the ones teaching controversial subjects or topics,
hesitant or even afraid of performing their duties because any perceived mistake, however
small, can end up on their records and set them back when seeking a permanent position or a
promotion. Even if an improved statement was to mention their commitment to protecting
instructors from unjust accusations, however, the fact remains that such a statement is a mere
aspirational one, which means it does not bind institutions to translate it into practical policy
changes. The systems of dealing with complaints at universities are obscure and designed to
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make as little information as possible publicly accessible. Unless controversies gain national
publicity, it is not at all difficult to showcase high flying principles while in practice
continuing the “customer is king” strategy of addressing speech issues that uncritically caters
to students’ demands.
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C. “Violent” Views and Freedom of Academic Inquiry
A grander and a much older tradition equivalent to the desire to pursue ‘safety’ by
stifling expression on campuses and in the classroom are tendencies of activist movements to
demand for censorship when they perceive certain scientific findings as harmful to the groups
on whose behalf they advocate. Just as student protestors shouting down speakers rarely take
the time to understand the speaker’s views, such activists often fail to accurately represent the
scientists they critique. Along the same lines, both groups show utter disregard for the
speaker’s or the scientist’s intent. Ironically, the motivations of both students and the majority
of activists who join the bandwagon of condemnation are most often good: while some stoop
to purposeful misrepresentation or smear-campaigns, the majority merely wish to protect
groups of individuals that painful history has made well-deserving of protection. Yet by
declaring certain lines of inquiry as off-limits, such an anti-scientific way of pursuing social
justice endangers the freedom of academic inquiry and in the long term does more harm than
good for the groups it strives to protect. Alice Dreger, a former professor of bioethics at
Northwestern University and a life-long activist herself, explores cases in which activism
endangers the freedom of academic inquiry in Galileo’s Middle Finger. With the help of
Dreger’s work, I will delve into three case-studies of the controversies regarding E.O.
Wilson, Napoleon Chagnon, and Michael Bailey in order to highlight the way misguided
protectionism affects the state of academia.
Importantly, however, condemning some kinds of protests and some forms of activism
must never be taken as a blanket dismissal of protest, social justice, and activism. Dreger
certainly subscribes to the idea that it is important for the public to carefully monitor science
and voice concerns where concerns are due. In fact, she insightfully presents science and
social justice efforts as necessarily co-dependent: “Science and social justice require each
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other to be healthy, and both are critically important to human freedom. Without a just
system, you cannot be free to do science, including science designed to better understand
human identity; without science, and especially scientific understandings of human
behaviors, you cannot know how to create a sustainably just system” (17). Activism needs to
recognize the importance of scientific inquiry into identity and human behaviors; only
solutions informed by an understanding of intra-group dynamics and identity can in the long
term better the treatment of indigenous communities, people of color, and transgender
individuals. The examples that will follow are cases in which few individuals hastily wishing
to discredit a successful scientific figure manipulate and weaponize people’s inclinations to
stand against injustice and protect a vulnerable minority group from harm. They carry a
warning against joining a witch hunt upon insufficient evidence and demonstrate how easily
pursuing ‘safety’ can be used to stifle academic inquiry in areas where science is most needed
to separate the wheat from the chaff and lead us to a better understanding of ourselves and
those we most differ from.
1. E.O. Wilson
Edward O. Wilson (1929-2021) was a renowned biologist and an expert at the
forefront of many groundbreaking discoveries on biodiversity, insects, and human nature. The
controversial years in his career, as Carl Zimmer writes in his obituary, began when Wilson
took the vast knowledge of evolutionary principles which he accrued through studying insects
and applied it to the investigation of other animals and subsequently people. In 1975, Wilson
published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis which established him as the father of this new
field. While Wilson was careful to warn that applying evolutionary principles to humans
would not be simple and even called for a discipline of “anthropological genetics,” some
dogmatically condemned sociobiology and with it Wilson and marked it as an advocacy for
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biological determinism that was historically used to excuse oppression and even genocide
(Zimmer). Never mind that Wilson’s work was a professional, nuanced, and a careful foray
into thinking about humans as evolved beings and that he made great efforts to emphasize
that sociobiology offers no excuse for racism, sexism, and antisemitism. Mere guilt by
association was enough to brand him as an enemy.
Those most convinced by the unprofessional and poorly-reasoned smear-campaign
against Wilson’s work not only denounced the work but took pains to harass the scientist. In
1978 members of self-proclaimed “International Committee Against Racism” rushed on the
stage when Wilson was about to speak and chanted “Racist Wilson, you can’t hide, we charge
you with genocide!” (Zimmer). Dreger reports that Wilson having recently broken his leg
“was in a cast that stretched almost from his ankle to his hip” (139) which the protesters took
little notice to as they proceeded to dump ice water on him shouting “Wilson you are all
Wet!” (Zimmer; Dreger, 139). Even his Harvard colleagues, most notably Richard Lewontin
and Gould, publicly accused Wilson of “promoting a dangerous right-wing science” (209).
Rather than actually engaging with Wilson’s writing, such colleagues misconstrued
implications of Wilson’s scientific work and in the classic example of a straw man fallacy
dogmatically condemned Wilson for the crimes he has not committed. Under the pretense of
protecting groups historically affected by eugenics and determinist thinking, such a public
smear campaign wrought havoc in the life of a respectable scientist. As he reflects in an
interview with Dreger: “I couldn’t sit by and let them say something that was in fact
declaring me a racist and a proto-Nazi. I couldn’t say, “No comment.” I just wasted enormous
amounts of energy and just pure time I could have used for something much more valuable”
(211). E.O Wilson regained some level of public trust once the scientists who took time to
look into his ideas began researching the ways genes influence behaviors in human and
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non-human species. But the development of the field of sociobiology has certainly been
slower because it began in unnecessary controversy.
2. Napoleon Chagnon
According to Dreger the controversy regarding Napoleon Chagnon demonstrates what
happens when truth is not merely overlooked but crushed for political purposes. She calls this
disregard for evidence “dangerous intellectual rot occurring within certain branches of
academe” and wittily describes Chagnon’s case as a situation in which “liberal hearts bleed so
much that brains stop getting enough oxygen” (129). Indeed, the story is bizarre and reads
like an adventure melodrama: a scientist investing decades of his life into the study of the
Yanomamö tribe living in the jungle between Brazil and Venezuela retrospectively receives
false accusations of harming the indigenous people through his work and his life and career
gets completely upheaved because organizations that should stand behind protocol-abiding
scientists such as the American Anthropological Association (AAA) are too eager to present
themselves as protectors of the indigenous communities to fact-check the accusations before
condemning and ostracizing a fellow academic. For the purposes of this work, I will not
delve into all the exciting details of the situation that clear Chagnon’s name and explain how
(and why) Patrick Tierney, the author of the libelous book Darkness in El Dorado: How
Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazon (2000), distorted reality and accused
Chagnon of purposefully spurring wars, withholding medical care, and causing a measles
outbreak among the Yanomamö people just to study them. The details are well recorded in
Dreger’s Galileo’s Middle Finger and elsewhere. Most relevant to the question of freedom of
academic inquiry is the response of organizations such as AAA to the accusations as it
demonstrates how good intentions of protecting a vulnerable group can be destructive to the
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field that does most to progress the society’s understanding of indigenous people, their ways
of life, and the value of protecting their interests.
After the publication of Tierney’s book, the AAA called together a taskforce to look
into the case and passed a quick judgment condemning their colleague and his work at a
conference without giving his side any proper consideration: “although Chagnon was
obviously being put on trial at the AAA, no one from the association ever issued him a formal
invitation to defend himself. He was to be tried in absentia” (132). Jane Hill, the chair of the
taskforce, in response to a fellow scientist who expressed concern about AAA’s hasty
condemnation of Chagnon elaborates on the reasons for such a rapid decision:
“The book is just a piece of sleaze, that’s all there is to it (some cosmetic language
will be used in the report but we all agree on that). But I think the AAA had to do something
because I really think that the future of work by anthropologists with indigenous peoples in
Latin America—with a high potential to do good—was put seriously at risk by its
accusations, and silence on the part of the AAA would have been interpreted as either assent
or cowardice. Whether we’re doing the right thing will have to be judged by posterity”
(Dreger, 162).
Hill’s message demonstrates that the decision of the AAA was well-intended, but also
that it was clearly influenced by the external pressures placed onto them by a kind of activism
that believes you must instantly decide to be either for the cause or the cause’s enemy. Rather
than allowing people the time to examine the work of the accused and decide whether or not
condemnation is in order, individuals, college administrations, and larger organizations face
extreme pressures to immediately take a stance. When the line between science and politics
blurs too much, a task force created to examine the accusations absurdly feels it must
condemn the accused and do it immediately. By condemning a scientist upon insufficient
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evidence and upon knowing the main source of accusations against him to be “a piece of
sleaze,” an organization such as the AAA trades in the values of science and inquiry for
virtue signaling. Similarly, in the college setting, institutions of learning feel pressed to
condemn instructors the moment they face an accusation of hurting a student’s feelings.
Protecting freedom of speech in higher education does not mean administration must stand
behind just about any conduct of their instructors. Likewise, upkeeping the values of science
does not require the likes of AAA and Chagnon to entirely disregard social concerns while
pursuing the truth. As Dreger reports, Chagnon himself sought a balance between free inquiry
but also socially aware inquiry: “when he found out that the data he had collected on
Yanomamö infanticide might be used by the Venezuelan government against them, he had
essentially withdrawn the data /…/ this was a scientist out primarily for truth, but never at the
cost of justice” (138). Examining and working to prevent ways in which science can be used
to propagate injustice bears incredible importance, but condemnations of scientific endeavors
ought to be grounded in strong evidence and carefully considered. If those standing up for
indigenous people are not guided by a care for truth, evidence, and critical thinking, their
protectionism is either a mere performance or an ugly exercise of power.
3. Michael Bailey
In the case of Michael Bailey, a psychologist at Northwestern University, the activists
feigning to protect the transgender community by starting a crusade in fact appeared to be
motivated by the desire to have absolute power and control over the truth about transgender
identities. In Dreger’s words, they “tried to bury a politically challenging scientific theory by
killing the messenger” and in the process “charged Bailey with a whole host of serious
crimes, including abusing the rights of subjects, having sex with a transsexual research
subject, and making up data” in order to discredit him enough to bury his ideas (15). The
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undesirable ideas Bailey expressed in his book The Man Who Would Be Queen (2003) were
from the current perspective on identity and sexuality extraordinarily progressive. He
opposed the traditional rather heteronormative understanding of transgenderism as a mere
glitch in the binary in which women end up trapped in male bodies and men trapped in
female bodies (Dreger, 15). By following the data he accumulated through years of working
with and interviewing transgender people, Bailey suggested that “in cases of men who
become women, transgender isn’t just about gender identity, but also about sexual
orientation—about eroticism” (Dreger, 14). Bailey emphasized that by giving greater nuance
to the picture of trans identity, his work advocates for the greater acceptance and a
normalization of transgender individuals and their wishes: in his book he “unequivocally
supports the right of all people to be gender-variant, to enjoy whatever sexual orientations
they have (so long as they’re not using anyone who can’t consent or hasn’t consented), to be
recognized by the gender labels they choose for themselves, and to get whatever medical
interventions they wish” (Dreger, 82). Partly because most of those condemning him did not
read his work, however, his attempts to forward the transgender cause were condemned as
transphobic.
To those interested in the full details of how Bailey’s main opponents bent the truth to
manufacture outrageous and entirely false allegations about him I yet again suggest reading
Dreger’s book. For my purposes, Bailey’s story demonstrates that those willing to manipulate
people’s inclinations to passionately stand up for injustice wield a dangerous amount of
power in our fast-paced and informationally chaotic society. Bailey’s case renders it explicit
how the propagators of false accusations exploit a popular heuristic to trust the victims and
not fact-check every controversy as it arises. Such a heuristic stems from a very
understandable calculation: failing to protect the victims because of a hesitancy to believe
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them often in the long run produces more harm than believing instantly and correcting
yourself later on the occasion of a false positive. When both the stigma on challenging
scientific, social, or political authorities and the risk that victims undertook by voicing their
pain were much greater than today, such a heuristic might have worked splendidly. As the
cases of E.O. Wilson, Chagnon, and Bailey as well as many similar controversies that have
occurred since demonstrate, however, believing instantly and immediately and loudly
supporting condemnation whenever a vulnerable group’s safety is in question no longer
presents a responsible course of action from an epistemic standpoint.
Moreover, contrary to what the most zealous activists might wish us to believe,
immediately condemning the accused without looking into the details of the situation and
examining the evidence is neither the only nor the best course of action to take for someone
genuinely invested in social justice. To demonstrate this point imagine you get into a dispute
with your tax-filing service—they claim you owe more tax than you believe you do. You
message two friends letting them know you are besides yourself because a tax service wants
you to pay too much tax. The first friend replies: “I’m 100% on your side in this. They are
absolutely horrible. I’m posting bad reviews on their website and social media as we speak.”
The second friend replies: “I’m sorry you feel that way. What precisely is the disagreement
about? Send me the details and I’ll look into it—it could just be a misunderstanding.” Which
one of the two friends strikes you as more genuine in their care about you? While the first
friend enthusiastically and immediately voices their support for you, he does not seem to care
to invest the effort into discovering the truth about the situation. Some might say that the only
truth that should matter to him is that you are his friend and therefore worthy of unconditional
support, but if you happen to be mistaken in your judgment and your friend does not care to
learn more, his support might encourage you to commit tax fraud. The second friend, I argue,
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responds better because he expresses sympathy for your feelings but also a care for learning
the relevant facts that will allow him to take proper action in supporting you once he knows
that pursuing the dispute is within your long-term best interests. In the world of social justice
activism, especially the one concerned with watching over science, a sincere concern for truth
is of the utmost importance for protecting the interests of the vulnerable groups in the
long-term.
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Conclusion
After looking at the history of free expression, weighing philosophical arguments for
and against its regulation, examining insights from evolutionary psychology and
neuroscience, and heeding the warnings presented by censorial attitudes of youth and
academia, I have arrived at the following conclusion: by far greater dangers lie in censoring
expression then in permitting expression to be almost absolutely free. The key foundation of
my reasoning and, in my opinion, the most important front on which the battle for free
expression will be fought in this age, is the notion that language is not violence, words do not
wound, and expression does not do harm.
What does it mean to reject the “speech=violence” fallacy? Does it require you to
reject the idea that words are powerful tools of coercion? That expression can lead to
negative consequences? That verbal abuse and name-calling are not serious issues? Not in the
slightest. I do not deny the significant role language plays in exercising power over people, in
organizing crime, and in creating psychological distress, to name only a few examples. I do
insist, however, that between hate speech and a hate crime there is a decision to act. Choice
stands in between propaganda and genocide and separates reading online forums from act of
school shooting. The pen is indeed mightier than the sword: compelling ideas can convince
many to act simultaneously while brute force coerces only the few within its reach. But
compared to the sword, the pen’s success rate is low: it only moves those already predisposed
to choose the action it advocates for. Harms inflicted by expression are almost never directly
caused and inevitable, but mediated by a decision, a choice. By restricting freedom of
expression, we thus rob people of the liberty to choose what to do. Letting people decide
what to do is highly dangerous, but it is also what grounds all other human liberties.
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Many worry that claiming that speech cannot be violence because it is mediated by
choice implies that when words cause us psychological pain and distress, we choose said hurt
and inflict it onto ourselves. It would seem that rejecting the “speech=violence” fallacy
requires us to tell a victim of degrading racial slurs, a survivor of sexual abuse experiencing
intense anxiety when she reads a description of a rape case in a textbook, or even someone
suffering from repeated verbal abuse to just “suck it up,” “toughen up,” and stop overreacting
to “mere words.” While some have indeed drawn such connections, I reject the notion that
such are the necessary implications of rejecting the “speech=violence” fallacy. There are
cases in which the time to make a choice and form a decision before acting is so restricted
that the onus lies on the initiator of an action to foresee a response. For example, the man
who throws the first punch is responsible for spurring actions of self-defense in its opponent.
While the opponent could have in theory chosen not to retaliate violently, we do not blame
him for responding with a punch. Like a person defending themselves, victims of “just
words” are not necessarily to blame for the pain they suffer as their emotional reactions are
often as natural as self-defense.
Adopting the notion that choice mediates the relationship between speech and
violence does not require us to “blame the victim” and guilt people whenever they experience
distress, offense, and pain as a result of someone’s words. What it allows us, however, is to
offer them an empowering reminder that they are capable of affecting the way they process
the words intended to harm them. You cannot give people the mental tools to make a
bullet-wound disappear or ways of thinking that will take away the pain of a nasty stab
wound and make it heal without any scarring. By training mental resilience, however, you
can give people the knowledge and skills with which they can greatly lessen the pain that
expression brings about. Even more importantly, however, by changing their understanding
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of language’s role in our lives, people can in the long term prevent traumatic experiences
from negatively affecting their quality of life. Even the most nasty, despicable, and morally
abhorrent words are just words; verbal virulence, no matter how intense, does not have the
power to objectively undo people’s worth and dignity.
It is crucial, therefore, that we reject the notion that speech equals violence, but that
we do it without denying empathy and understanding to those who are negatively affected by
expression. Especially when it comes to issues close to people’s hearts such as racial justice,
issues of gender identity, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs, it is important that we find
a way to discuss words as “just words” without underscoring or misunderstanding the
emotional pain speech can bring about. Defending free expression not only defends the rights
of the offended, the hurt, and the upset to argue back, but also grounds the right of bystanders
to openly debate, question, and point out the flaws of distressing views. Universities in
particular have the duty to allow for the discussion of even unwelcome, offensive, and
disagreeable ideas and to teach their students that they have a choice how to interact with
ideas that may evoke pain in them. If young people are not trained in mental resilience and
encouraged to adopt the saying “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never
hurt me,” it is unsurprising that they see it as justifiable to throw sticks and stones at those
whose words they disagree with.
It is very easy to look at freedom of expression and see in it an obstacle to a
harmonious society, an excuse to be rude, uncivil, and to spread hatred. It is just as easy to
forget that free expression topples tyrannical governments, exposes and rights injustices,
propels scientific development, inspires artistic innovation, and grounds our very ability to
hope, dream, and self-determine. The concern over the appropriateness of what is expressed
too often detracts our attention from the value we lose when ideas are suppressed. Censorship
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and regulations of expression demand too high a price for a kind of safety that we should not
desire as it becomes attainable only when we eliminate human freedom.
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APPENDIX: DePauw University
In both 2020 and 2021 DePauw University was crowned as the worst university for
free speech out of first out of 55 and then out of 154 US institutions according to the survey
sponsored by College Pulse, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), and
RealClearEducation. The survey covers three kinds of questions across which DePauw
ranked poorly. The first kind of questions rates students’ comfort with exercising their own
right to free expression by expressing their views on a controversial political topic in various
settings. DePauw’s ratings reveal a concerning atmosphere of self-censorship with 31% of
students feeling very uncomfortable expressing their views on a controversial political topic
in a classroom and 20% very uncomfortable expressing their views to other students in
common areas (College Pulse/FIRE). The second kind of questions explores the students’
tendencies to permit others to exercise their right to free expression. Questions were asked
about whether you would be supportive of allowing speakers with various controversial
positions of speaking and how permissive you are towards actions blocking people from
exercising their free expression. DePauw’s students foster such censorious tendencies as 30%
see it as at least sometimes acceptable to use violence to stop a campus speech (College
Pulse/FIRE). The third kind of questions aimed to assess the students’ view of how much
their administration protects freedom of expression. DePauw students rated their
administration exceedingly poorly as only 2% of students found it extremely clear that their
administration protects free expression and only 1% of students thought it extremely likely
that the administration would defend a speaker’s right to express their views should a
controversy occur (College Pulse/FIRE).
An environment of self-censorship and over-sensitivity is very difficult to repair, but
an important aspect of making DePauw’s campus a better place for a free exchange of ideas is
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for the administration to clearly communicate that they defend the value of free expression.
In an effort to do so, DePauw is hoping to adopt its own statement on the university’s values
regarding freedom of expression by the fast approaching May 2022. DePauw’s decision not
to adopt the statement of the University of Chicago who ranked highest in the surveys in
2020 and second highest in 2021 is in itself a peculiar one. Joining the ranks of schools who
have adopted the Chicago Principles would be a great way for DePauw to make a public
commitment to improving its campus climate and addressing its free speech problem so that
DePauw’s students can enjoy a comparable learning environment to that of the nation’s finest
institutions. In fact, the ways in which a draft of DePauw’s statement diverges from the
Chicago Principles reveals fascinating clues into how playing into the “speech equals
violence” fallacy with loose diction obstructs well-meaning aspirations to defend freedom of
expression.
The draft of DePauw’s statement that has not yet been approved and is subject to
potential changes includes several important similarities with the Chicago statements. It aims
to emulate Chicago Principles in expressing faith in individual autonomy by asserting that it
“is not the role of the University to shield individuals from ideas or opinions they find
unwelcome, disagreeable, or even offensive” and that “it is for the individual members of the
community, not for the institution, to make judgments for themselves and act on those
judgments, not by seeking to suppress speech but by openly contesting ideas they oppose”
(DePauw). However, the draft also asserts that one of the key requirements of DePauw’s
Mission is to foster an “environment in which everyone feels safe to present their diverse
ideas, even those that may seem offensive or repulsive” (DePauw). While it is certainly
important for students to be safe and protected when voicing diverse ideas, requiring that they
feel safe at all times conflicts with the significance of free expression for education—in
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discussion and debate students ought to be brave and exploratory even when it feels risky or
as University of Chicago’s president asserts: “education should not be intended to make
people comfortable, it is meant to make them think” (University of Chicago). Similar to
conflating being and feeling safe, the draft of DePauw’s statement imprecisely endorses the
idea that speech equals violence by stating: “we must be ever mindful of the powerful duality
of words. They can wound as well as illuminate and teach” (DePauw). To reiterate my
arguments from earlier chapters, it is an imprecise and a dangerous conflation of figurative
and literal expression to say that words wound. Indeed, expression can lead to emotional
distress and psychological discomfort. Using certain words can lead to distress and
discomfort. But distress and discomfort differ in kind from a wound or an injury.
The same kind of a seemingly innocent lapse of linguistic precision occurs in the
draft’s section discussing “Community Expectations and Responsibilities” when the authors
express the hope that members of DePauw community “will consider carefully the use of
words that may harm [emphasis added] others” (DePauw). Such instances of poor wording
create a sense of conflict within the very draft of DePauw’s statement. Namely, it appears as
if DePauw endorses the erroneous notions that speech equals violence, words wound, and
expression harms and yet the draft states that the university aspires to an environment in
which disagreement is not perceived as a threat: “In a community marked by true inclusion
and equity, even fierce debates [emphasis added] about a range of differences of opinions and
perspectives are not experienced as personal attacks [emphasis added] on one’s very
humanity and sense of well-being and belonging” (DePauw). On the one hand, it seems as if
this sentence forwards the very important notion that expression in an educational setting
should not be experienced as a threat to one’s humanity, well-being, and belonging. On the
other hand, however, the sentence could mean to assert that students’ subjective experience of
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speech is a marker of “true inclusion and equity.” The latter would mean that the draft’s
authors are saying that when DePauw’s students take expression as a personal attack on their
humanity, they are not over-reacting and perceiving speech as more powerful than it is.
Rather, their upset acts as an indicator that DePauw’s administration ought to work harder in
ensuring “true inclusion and equity” is attained. The future of free expression at DePauw is
bleak if its administration presents “inclusion and equity” as a precondition for free
expression rather than the other way around. A healthy culture of free expression is necessary
for members of DePauw’s community to make sense of the meaning of the vague values of
inclusion and equity and realize them in practice: free expression is a precondition for
enacting those values rather than a reward after they are attained.
Compared to the Chicago Principles, the draft of DePauw’s statement seems to
present freedom of expression as much more dependent on competing values. The Chicago
Statement emphasizes that while civility and mutual respect are important “concerns about
civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of
ideas” (University of Chicago). DePauw’s draft, on the other hand warns that “legal
protections for free expression /…/ may sometimes supersede the values of civility and
mutual respect” and instead of focusing on defending freedom of expression even in
controversial cases suggests it should be exercised cautiously: “we encourage members of the
community to consider these values carefully in exercising their fundamental right to free
expression” (DePauw). Pressing community members to carefully consider competing values
in exercising their freedom of expression seems admirable, but it is counterproductive to
addressing the culture of self-censorship: too great a concern over how expression will be
perceived is likely to play a role in currently stifling DePauw students’ willingness to express
their views inside and outside of the classroom. Respect and civility are incredibly important,
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but what if a culture of politicized oversensitivity takes some kinds of views to be harmful,
dehumanizing, and wounding no matter how carefully and respectfully they are expressed?
DePauw University is not unique in struggling to find room for free expression while
catering to the trends of political correctness and extreme sensitivity to social justice issues.
Catering to the customer by adopting the rhetoric supportive of the ideas that language,
expression, and speech can equal violence, however, leaves little to no room for freedom of
expression to exist in a meaningful way. While the efforts from DePauw’s administration to
address the worrying state of freedom of expression on its campus are an encouraging step
forward, they ought to begin by voicing a firmer and clearer endorsement of the value than
the current draft provides. Most importantly, the administration ought to commit to defending
their faculty, staff, and students when exercising their right sparks discontent. Fostering an
environment of civility, respect, inclusion, and equity is important, but those values must not
be used as an excuse to perpetuate a soft stigma currently placed on freely, openly, and
daringly expressing ideas at DePauw University.
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